## Laws To Tax Marijuana (How To Tax It)

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Introduction

Doctor-recommended “medical” marijuana is already generating revenue across the country. As of early 2012, seventeen states and the District of Columbia are collecting revenue from an array of license fees and from sales taxes where they apply generally. Eleven cities in California are using four additional tax bases:

- percentage of gross receipts;
- square footage of business space;
- square footage of grow space; and
- number of plants.

Meanwhile, proposals in the states to legalize all marijuana would tax it on the basis of

- weight, which we use for tobacco; and
- potency, which we use for alcohol.

The battle of ideas is joined, in the American way. This article examines those ideas and the taxation of marijuana generally.

In addition to the tax base, the article looks at:

- which governments might tax marijuana;
- what, exactly, a tax should target;
- how to set rates;
- how to correct early efforts that go wrong and to win the inevitable price war against bootleggers;
- what license fees to impose;
- how to deal with home production;
- whether to give tax breaks for medical marijuana;
- how to identify and track tax-paid product;
- where in the supply chain to collect tax;
- whether state monopoly makes sense as a supplement to taxation; and
- what the effective date should be.

The article examines existing medical marijuana taxes and unenacted proposals to tax legalized recreational marijuana, including introduced bills\(^1\) in the legislatures of California,\(^2\)

\(^1\) An extensive list of proposals appears at Richard Evans, “Cannabis Taxation & Regulation,” available at [http://cantaxreg.com/](http://cantaxreg.com/), under “Legalization Proposals” (last visited Dec. 7, 2010). This site is probably the most comprehensive compilation of information about laws to tax marijuana.

Massachusetts, and Washington State, and California’s failed Proposition 19, with its mirage-like revenue non-plan to legalize marijuana first and then maybe tax it later.

The article is just about revenue laws. It considers legal rules in light of precedent and analogy, and provides no original economic analysis. It is not about whether legalization is a good idea. It leaves aside imprisonment, impaired drivers, impaired workers, underage users, and the possibility of further corporatization of America. It looks at regulation and enforcement only as ways to make a revenue scheme work. It barely touches on the tension between enforcement schemes and civil liberties. It doesn’t estimate revenue. It is a work of tax law theory.

6 Economists do not agree on the level of current consumption, current street prices, the elasticity of demand, the extent of bootlegging after legalization, and more. See Robert A. Mikos, “State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes,” U. Chi. Legal F. 222 (2010), downloadable at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1549828 [hereinafter “State and Federal”]. For instance, legalization might cause some people to consume less as the lure of rebellion vanishes, but the notion that legalization will reduce overall use seems far-fetched. See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice 16-17 (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008) [hereinafter “Regulating Vice”]. Economists won’t agree on a maximizing rate or on how much revenue a given tax rate might raise.
9 The latest word in revenue analysis appears in a recent study, Beau Kilmer et al., Altered State?: Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in California Could Influence Marijuana Consumption and Public Budgets (Rand Corp. 2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP315.pdf [hereinafter “Altered State”]. This study seems thorough; admirably, it admits to uncertainty. To be sure, it analyzes only what has been on the table in California, that is, a weight-based tax, not a tax based on potency. Formal proposals in California don’t include measures to defeat post-legalization bootlegging, such as identification and
In 1933 hearings leading up to re-imposition of taxes on alcohol after Prohibition, one witness said tax advocates who “know very little about this business” were “etherizing, futurizing, generalizing, and theorizing.”¹⁹ I’m afraid you will find that kind of thing here, dear reader. But it’s a start.

**To Tax or Not To Tax?**

“What are we mad at today?” That question kicked off many a Capitol Hill meeting of staff tax drafters aiming to find technical options to raise revenue. Loopholes, disparate treatment of similar taxpayers, unintended subsidies – these were the targets. Staff looked through the capillaries of the law to find indefensible tax breaks that the public would disapprove of – and that Members of Congress would agree to end.

The public, however indirectly, was in charge of the process. The public is in charge of taxing substances, too. But there’s a big difference: When the public disapproves a substance, the public may (1) prohibit it or (2) tax it.

Today, much of the public dislikes recreational use of marijuana enough to prohibit it. If the public’s mood shifts, it will shift incrementally; if marijuana is ever legalized, the public will still dislike it enough to want to tax the heck out of it.¹⁰ Taxing is measured and more moderate; it may be more sustainable.¹¹ Folks who don’t consume marijuana could realize in small part the tracking of tax-paid products, so the study does not consider such measures, either. The Rand study did not undertake to suggest effective tax laws, just as this article does not undertake to estimate revenue.

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¹⁰ North Carolina Governor Bev Perdue, unable to outlaw video gambling operations effectively, says “We need to tax the heck out of them and regulate them, regulate them hard.” http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/06/07/2120002/perdue-proposes-taxes-on-sweepstakes.html#storylink=cpy (Jun. 8, 2012).

¹¹ See generally Sijbren Cnossen, Excise Systems: A Global Study of the Selective Taxation of Goods and Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Theory and Practice of Excise Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Pollution, and Driving (Sijbren Cnossen ed., Oxford University Press, 2005) [hereinafter “Theory and Practice”]. Paternalistic taxes seek to protect individuals (who may lack belief in current or future damage) from themselves, that is, from negative internalities. Pigouvian taxes seek to compensate society for damage the user does to others, that is, for negative externalities. (Often those two categories overlap: cigarettes harm the user and, through second hand smoke, at least, harm innocent bystanders.)

Pigouvian taxes are compatible with the view that a tax should be “[n]eutral in its impact on resource allocation decisions” while allowing for non-neutrality where there are negative externalities or “spillover effect[s].” Richard K. Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway, “Some Underlying Principles of Tax Policy,” Joint Economic Committee Study (September 1998), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-growth/taxpol/taxpol.htm. (The authors identify but pointedly do not
dream that the late Russell Long, former Chair of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, described: “Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree.”

To be sure, taxing anything that people dislike is awkward. It creates a double bind: If revenue comes from a shunned source, it vanishes if that source is eliminated -- like golden eggs from an unwelcomed goose. Despite that double bind, and despite the arguments against regressivity and paternalism, so-called sin taxes on tobacco and alcohol bring revenue to every state and to the Union.

But most tax schemes are awkward. Today, we try to tax income from intangibles, which is hard to locate, much less measure. And we tax payroll, which is the last thing that we want the power of tax to destroy or even diminish. But we can measure marijuana; many citizens are mad at it; and it involves big money. So this article looks at taxing it.

Can governments actually collect a meaningful tax on marijuana? Well, “Prohibitionists had always argued that the liquor business was inherently unregulatable” -- until they were proved wrong. But maybe marijuana is different: Maybe, vis-à-vis human ingenuity, the “weed” is to tobacco as the zebra is to the horse.

But Americans might tolerate marijuana tax cheaters no more than they tolerate moonshiners. Throughout our history, “[m]aking drinkers pay higher taxes for their liquor and punishing tax evaders were state powers most citizens recognized; denying drinkers the right to buy their liquor endorse “[t]he economically most neutral of all taxes[,] . . . a head tax, a levy of, say, $200 on every person.”) A variety of objections to excise taxes appears in William F. Shugart, II, ed., Taxing Choice: The Predatory Politics of Fiscal Discrimination (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1997).


To the extent that a small daily amount of alcohol promotes health, a tax exemption, or even a subsidy, for the use of such an amount might be ideal. See Dale Gieringer, “Economics of Cannabis Legalization,” National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, at 7 (June 1994), available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/NORML_Economics_Cannabis_Legalization.pdf (last visited September 7, 2010) [hereinafter “Economics of Legalization”]. Ideal, but unadministrable: It’s hard to imagine tailoring a tax scheme for each individual. See Regulating Vice, supra note 8, at 144.


was state imposition of one group’s morality upon another group.”16 During Prohibition, the alcohol bootlegger presented the powerful, macho image of wealthy, feared, uncontrollable kingpin (like the Mexican cartel owners today). Now he’s a toothless, clueless hillbilly, sneaking around the backwoods by the light of the moon.

Americans come together in our lack of patience with tax cheaters. Our yearning for freedom is about self-determination: It’s not about price.

Which Governments?

The article looks first at who might impose tax, and only later at what might be taxed, on what base, how much, how, and when.

The Question of Scale

Small groups tend to reach consensus more readily than large groups.17 Consensus is easier in a state than in the Union for a second reason: People in a given state tend to have more homogenous views than do all Americans.18 Similarly, localities agree more readily than a state: Look at local option laws for alcohol.

Because small jurisdictions can act quickly, they can reverse course quickly. Like our taxes on beverage alcohol,19 taxes on marijuana may need much trial and many errors to stabilize. Localities can nimibly change schemes that produce unintended consequences. Moreover, gradual adoption of legalization schemes can provide lessons for other jurisdictions.20

16 Wilbur R. Miller, Revenuers and Moonshiners 8 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 1991). In addition to ordinary citizens, in the late 1800s, for example, “Taxpaying distillers became important allies in the [revenue] bureau’s crusade against evasion.” Id. at 6.
20 Opportunities to experiment are a valuable feature of our federal system. For instance, within living memory, vehicles could not legally turn right at red lights in this country. But the states started experiments, the federal government followed in 1975, and experimentation continues. So “North America is [or was reportedly in 2002, at least] the only place in the world where the RTOR is allowed.” Dominique Lord, “Synthesis on the Safety of Right Turn on Red in the United States and Canada” (Nov. 2002), at 11 and 15, available at https://ceprofs.civil.tamu.edu/dlord/Papers/TRB_3410_Lord_RTOR_Nov_2002.pdf.
But smaller may not be better. The administration of a tax involves economies of scale. That is, the cost of creating new procedures and new forms from scratch can be spread among many people in a populous jurisdiction. Only populous jurisdictions can afford sophisticated approaches, like testing for potency and high-tech identification of tax-paid merchandise, that require high fixed costs.

**A Federal Tax**

The federal government imposes a special, targeted tax rule on marijuana businesses. Code section 280E states:

“No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substance Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.” That provision denies deductions for rent, salaries, and the like, and drives the tax-reporting medical marijuana trade away from advertising and toward micro-businesses.

A direct and more explicit federal marijuana tax won’t be coming soon. Crypto-anarchists and well-meaning but naïve citizens oppose anything called a tax, even a useful tax. We would have to pull out of a multi-lateral drug treaty -- or override it, as we often do with tax treaties. And a marijuana tax wouldn’t raise enough revenue to make a big dent in a debt reported in tenths of trillions of dollars.

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21 Any federal marijuana tax will come with less dispatch than the tax on newly legalized alcohol came after Prohibition was repealed on December 5, 1933. Then, the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means reported a bill on January 3, 1934, that went through the House and Senate in time for President Roosevelt to sign on January 11, just eight days later. Hu, supra note 19, at 81. In that case, Congress had the benefit of studying the results of historic tax rates on alcohol in the United States and both historic and contemporary rates in other countries. See 1933 Hearings, supra note 9.


24 Treaties are not a higher form of law than statutes in the United States (unlike in some countries). “Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. So "an Act of Congress. . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and . . . when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 18 (1956).

But that pesky debt keeps piling up, so the country may get desperate. A financial collapse could lead to strong-arm rule. Power may devolve to the states. If so, everything would be on the table.

State Taxes and Federalism

If any state taxes marijuana, it will need the federal government to acquiesce. That was happening as this article went to press in State Tax Notes in January 2011. The City of Oakland had been singling out medical marijuana by collecting a modest gross receipts tax on it since January 1, 2010. The federal government has not totally shut it down. Oakland’s tax collection benefitted from the benign neglect the Obama Administration was taking toward medical marijuana. By mid-2012, though, Department of Justice attorneys were not so


The Obama Administration has, however, stopped Oakland’s plan to allow huge, industrial scale grow houses. Similarly, States and localities collecting taxes “cannot necessarily block federal authorities from seizing the information they glean from drug distributors.” State and Federal, supra note 6, at 225.

Attorney General Holder has said, "it will not be a priority to use federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers who are complying with state laws on medical marijuana.” Carrie Johnson, “U.S. Eases Stance on Medical Marijuana,” The Washington Post (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/10/19/AR2009101903638.html. This benign neglect is a manifestation of standard prosecutorial discretion. If it extended to recreational marijuana, under the Narcotic Convention, supra note 23, foreign countries could complain about the inaction. Then they would have to try to settle the dispute “by negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of [both countries’] own choice.” Id. Article 48. After all that, complainants could go to the International Court of Justice, perhaps for some international equivalent of a writ of mandamus. This
restrained.

In 2010, the Administration took a hard line against legalization and Proposition 19 in California.\textsuperscript{30} Maybe that hard line would yield to a sensible scheme that was thought through in advance rather than puncted, Proposition 19-style, to localities, free to race to the bottom. Indeed, “drug hawks would probably prefer that California impose some sanction on marijuana (that is, a tax) than no sanction at all.”\textsuperscript{31}

By analogy, the federal government tolerates state revenue from the suspect activity of gambling. But the public tolerates gambling more than marijuana.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, a lot of citizens are mad at Washington and want Washington to leave them alone.\textsuperscript{33} Fiscal conservatives, social liberals, and libertarians may not be a majority of the country, but they have enough influence not to be sneezed at. And the federal government may tread cautiously on revenue sources in states it may be asked to bail out.

**Revenue for Localities**

States could allow autonomy or provide revenue to localities in various ways.

**Local Option for Legalization**

Many states let localities decide whether something is legal. In North Carolina, for example, “dry” counties and towns allow no alcohol sales; other localities allow sales of beer and wine only; for liquor, some allow sales of liquor only for off-premises consumption, while some allow both those and liquor by the drink.\textsuperscript{34}

For marijuana, states could let localities opt into or out of legalization. Legalizers\textsuperscript{35} of marijuana might prevail politically in a state only by allowing localities to choose prohibition.\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{30}Evan Perez, “U.S. Casts Vote Against Pot,” *Wall St. J.* A4 (Oct. 16-17, 2010).

\textsuperscript{31}State and Federal, *supra* note 6, at 249.

\textsuperscript{32}Another analogy cuts the other way: Utah gained admission into the Union only after agreeing to ban polygamy: the whole wasn’t going to tolerate blatant divergence from a popular norm by one of its parts. See *Utah History to Go, “Statehood and the Progressive Era,” available at http://historytogo.utah.gov/lessons/statehoodandtheprogressiveera.html* (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). But people were really, really mad at polygamy.

\textsuperscript{33}“Owing to a variety of factors, citizens on average deem state and local governments far more trustworthy than the national government.” Overlooked Powers, *supra* note 26, at 152.


\textsuperscript{35}This article calls advocates of legalization Legalizers, and advocates of current law Prohibitionists.

\textsuperscript{36}Even without taxes, a locality could benefit from the economic activity of legal retail marijuana sales. By analogy, an advocate of liquor by the drink makes this argument: “It allows good quality restaurants to come in and offer good paying jobs to stimulate the local economy.” “Stokesdale Liquor by the Drink
could also allow localities a menu of options, such as incorporation of the substance into edibles, on-premises smoking, and so on.

In theory, local option makes more sense for full legalization than for a medical-only scheme, at least for possession. It’s hard for a state to say sick people in only certain of its localities can use medicine. But allowing medical marijuana in areas where folks object to it may be part of the reason *Time* magazine asks, “Can a backlash be far behind?”

In California, Assembly Bill 2254, the most recent serious bill, would apply statewide. California Proposition 19, though, would have delegated to local governments the power to authorize commerce in marijuana.

Local Taxes in Lieu of State Taxes

If Proposition 19 had passed, localities could have imposed their own taxes on marijuana. Or not. In addition to any local schemes, the state could then have decided to tax it. Or not. (The proposition’s vagueness drew opposition from all sides.) By imposing no or low taxes, localities might have sought economic activity from their own residents, from nearby residents, or from tourists. That’s a race to the bottom. But there was evidence of a race to the middle, at least in Albany, California: proponents of an successful ballot measure there argued that a “proposed new tax would be comparable with nearby cities that are enacting similar ballot measures for a cannabis dispensary or business.”

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**References**

37 Andrew Ferguson, “How Marijuana Got Mainstreamed,” *Time* 30, 32 (Nov. 11, 2010), [hereinafter “Mainstreamed”].

38 Proposition 19 Text, *supra* note 5, section 2.B.7. But “if a city decides not to tax and regulate the sale of cannabis, . . . buying and selling cannabis within that city’s limits remain illegal, but . . . the city’s citizens still have the right to possess and consume small amounts [up to one ounce].”


Voters in Albany and nine other localities in California faced initiatives on November 2, 2010, to impose local taxes on marijuana: on the recreational kind in light of the possible passage of Proposition 19, and, sometimes separately, on the medical kind. They all passed. Table 1 describes them.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{42} Parallel sources could supply the information on Table 1. The sources cited were chosen because they furnish enough detail. This footnote lists first the source for the details of the proposal; then, after a semicolon, for voting results:

\textbf{Albany}: Albany Ordinance, \textit{supra} note 41 (this site expands on the cursory official ballot language); Alameda County Registrar of Voters, “General Election, November 2, 2010,” available at http://www.acgov.org/rov/current_election/index.htm (Click on Local, Albany, Measure Q) (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter “Alameda Results”].


\textbf{Oakland}: Alameda County Registrar of Voters, “City of Oakland Measure V; General Election, November 2, 2010,” available at http://www.acgov.org/rov/documents/local_measures_2010-11-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Alameda Results, \textit{supra}, (Click on Local, Oakland, Measure V).


Los Angeles voters enacted a 5-percent tax on gross receipts from the marijuana business in March 2011.43

### Local Taxes Piggybacking on State Taxes

In the American system of federal, state, and local governments, lower-tier governments may piggyback on an established, higher-tier revenue scheme. So today, localities often impose excise taxes on top of state excises. For example, New York City imposes a local tax of $1.50 on top of the state tax.

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43 The vote in favor was 59.3 percent. City of Los Angeles, “Election Night Results” (Mar. 8, 2011), available at [http://cityclerk.lacity.org/election/Results.htm](http://cityclerk.lacity.org/election/Results.htm).
per cigarette pack in addition to the state’s $4.35. Several localities in Alaska impose local cigarette taxes of a dollar or more per pack in addition to the state’s $2.00. These local excises, like piggybacked local sales taxes, are easy to administer. A marijuana scheme could follow their pattern.

**Targeted Revenue Sharing**

A state could transfer some of its excise receipts to the localities that choose to legalize the substance and produce the revenue. North Carolina does that with alcohol. About 70 percent of North Carolina’s quarter billion dollars of annual alcohol revenue goes to the state’s general fund, but nearly 20 percent goes back to those localities that choose to allow alcohol sales. None of that revenue goes directly to localities that ban alcohol.

**What substances?**

To impose tax, a jurisdiction needs a target (or subject), a measuring base, and a rate. This article now focuses on the target.

**A Light and Compact, but Pungent, Weed**

Defining taxable marijuana in words is easy. Pinning it down in the world is not.

To tax an intoxicant, alcohol taxes provide analogies. To tax a plant that people smoke or consume by mouth, tobacco taxes provide analogies. None of the analogies provides a perfect model for the battle against marijuana bootlegging.

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45 Id.


47 The U.S. Code says: “The term ‘marihuana’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.” 21 U.S.C. 802 (16). Legalization proposals track that language, but change the h in “marihuana” to a j. See, e.g., section 3 of A.B. 2254, supra note 2. For the purposes of this article, as in Proposition 19’s proposed section 11304(d)(1) of Article 5 of Chapter 5 of Division 10 of the Health and Safety Code, supra note 5, “Marijuana” and “Cannabis’ are interchangeable terms.”
Some factors make marijuana harder to tax than alcohol. First, marijuana is lighter and more compact by value.

Second, it’s harder to transport a liquid rather than a solid.

Third, processing raw materials for alcohol takes longer than for marijuana. Illegal distillation of spirits (which requires observable heat), fermentation of wine, and brewing of beer require hiding the time-consuming transformation of other liquids into alcohol. Marijuana processing is simpler.

Fourth, consumers understand that store-bought liquor is not poisonous but that moonshine liquor can kill them on the spot; bootlegged marijuana may contain more mold and pesticides than the regulated kind, but it shouldn’t bring on instant death. That makes bootlegged marijuana more marketable than bootlegged liquor.

Some factors make marijuana easier to tax than alcohol. First, some marijuana is very pungent. That makes it easy to find. Second, corn, grapes, and other raw materials for beverage alcohol are legal as they grow in the field, so any illegal activity is detectable only after the agricultural harvest. Contraband marijuana needs to be hidden while it grows, and aerial surveillance is a threat.

Compared to tobacco, marijuana is hard to tax—though it is more pungent and needs to be hidden while it grows. First, marijuana’s light weight and low bulk make it easier to hide. Second, tobacco is notoriously hard to grow. Marijuana grows easily: Primitive strains, at least, have the nickname weed. That factor makes marijuana harder to control and tax. Third, the process of converting sticky fresh tobacco into consumable form is observable: It requires either air-drying, which takes a long time, or artificial heating, which is tricky. Post-harvest processing of agricultural marijuana is simpler, so there is less time and there are fewer clues to find contraband during that phase.


49 But that’s not saying much: illicit production of tobacco to beat tax in the developed world is negligible. It happens in uncontrolled areas of the Third World, though. See text accompanying note 123, infra. And tax-arbitrage smuggling of low-tax paid tobacco across borders is a big problem. Id.

50 See State and Federal, supra note 6, at 236 n.58.
On balance, marijuana will be easier to bootleg and so harder to tax than both alcohol and tobacco.\(^{51}\)

**Hemp**

Many developed countries allow cultivation of the hemp plant for fiber and other products. Here, Federal law bans cultivation. But hemp would be tax-exempt under proposals in the states to tax psychoactive marijuana. California Assembly Bill 2254 says, “marijuana containing less than one-half of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol\(^{52}\) by weight is not subject to . . . [the $50 per ounce tax]”\(^{53}\) -- but it would make hemp dealers pay licensing fees. Meanwhile, the Massachusetts Bill would set the threshold at 1 percent THC.\(^{54}\)

Canada and the European Union ban marijuana and legalize hemp with a threshold of less than 0.3 percent THC.\(^{55}\) In addition, in Canada, regulations provide that “A person who holds a licence to cultivate industrial hemp only for fibre shall harvest the crop before the achenes of 50% of the plants are resistant to compression.”\(^{56}\) That’s head-scratcher for the layperson: It must mean that the grower must harvest the plant before it matures into psychoactivity. In any event, Canada has figured out how to make the distinction, so states should be able to do so, also, if they decide to. But they face the risk that bootleggers will hide marijuana plants in a hemp field as long as they can.

**Harder Drugs**

This article ignores harder drugs. Every drug would require its own analysis -- balancing the benefits of a ban against the fiscal and other benefits of regulating and taxing. This article does not make that analysis even for marijuana, much less for substances like heroin and cocaine.\(^{57}\)

\(^{51}\) For the relative difficulty of taxing marijuana on the basis of potency, see text accompanying note 75, infra.

\(^{52}\) Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol or THC is the main psychoactive ingredient of marijuana. Other psychoactive cannabinoids exist. See E.M. Williamson and F.J. Evans, “Cannabinoids in Clinical Practice” (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.cannabis-marijuana.com/cannabinoids/clinical.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). All pending proposals treat them as too negligible to consider.

\(^{53}\) A.B. 2254, supra note 2, proposed section 34004 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

\(^{54}\) Massachusetts Bill, supra note 3, section 4.d.


Harder drugs’ perceived negative externalities exceed those of marijuana. Moreover, they are lighter, less bulky, and less pungent than marijuana, so they are harder to detect, regulate, and tax. Absolutists who want to legalize everything can wait and see how different ideas for regulating and taxing marijuana might play out.

What Base?

After defining a subject for the tax, authorities need to choose a tax base. It could be weight, potency, percentage of sale price, some combination of those factors, or number of plants. Another possible base is square footage or value of production or business areas.

Weight

Weight is an obvious option for the base of a tax on marijuana. Already, “Twenty-one states have laws on the books that tax the sale of marijuana (and other illicit drugs)”\(^{58}\) on the basis of weight, though these dead-letter gotcha taxes are really fines. Weight is used to tax cigarette tobacco\(^ {59} \) regardless of tar and nicotine. Weight is the base used in A.B. 2254, the most recent serious California bill, at a rate of $50 per ounce.

Once moisture content is accounted for, a weight-based tax is easy to impose. A weight-based tax, though, will tend to drive less potent, cheaper product out of the market.\(^ {60} \)

Potency

Potency is a rough proxy for the tax base of the whole federal alcohol scheme. The federal tax on liquor is directly proportional to alcohol content.\(^ {61} \) The tax on wine jumps from $1.07 per wine gallon for alcohol content of 14 percent or less to $1.57 per gallon for potency of 14 percent.

\(^{58}\) State and Federal, \textit{supra} note 6, at 258. Those so-called taxes are supplements to enforcement schemes. Some have been found unconstitutional as self-incriminatory.

\(^{59}\) Weight-based taxes generally apply to large and small cigarettes, large and small cigars, pipe tobacco, smokeless tobacco (snuff and chewing tobacco), and roll-your-own tobacco. I.R.C. section 5701. To be precise, “On cigarettes, weighing not more than 3 pounds per thousand, [the tax rate is] $19.50 per thousand.” \textit{Id.} section 5701(b)(1). The tax (with a higher rate for heavier cigarettes), is thus technically per unit with a cap on unit weight. Taxes on cigarette papers and tubes are imposed by count. \textit{Id.} section 5710(c) and (d).


\(^{61}\) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Tax and Fee Rate [Table],” \textit{available at} http://www.ttb.gov/tax_audit/atftaxes.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2010). The tax rate is determined by proof gallon, which is the equivalent in alcohol content of a gallon of 100 proof (50 percent alcohol) liquor,
percent and over.\textsuperscript{62} It jumps again, to $3.15, for potency of 21 percent and over.\textsuperscript{63} Only the tax on beer, $18 per barrel of 31 gallons, does not turn on potency.\textsuperscript{64}

The federal scheme extends the potency concept to tax alcohol in hard liquor at a higher rate per ounce than in its less powerful competition,\textsuperscript{65} but generally does not tax alcohol in wine more heavily than in less potent beer. “The federal excise tax rates . . . are approximately 10 cents, 7 cents, and 21 cents per ounce of pure alcohol for beer, wine, and distilled spirits, respectively.”\textsuperscript{66} Maybe these rates reflect the clout of interest groups. Maybe, though, they reflect perceptions of tendency to overindulge with each kind of beverage.\textsuperscript{67}

For marijuana, “Ideally, the tax rate per ounce should be proportional to THC potency.”\textsuperscript{68} But potency-based taxation requires a new function: chemical analysis.\textsuperscript{69} Chemical analysis is easier for liquid, fungible alcoholic beverages than it is for a solid vegetable product: Analyzing dry marijuana would require either sampling or homogenization.

Sampling is the method used by Steep Hill Lab in Oakland. It tests potency for the medical marijuana industry by using a two-gram sample to represent up to two pounds of bulk material.

\textsuperscript{62} Id.
\textsuperscript{63} Id.
\textsuperscript{64} Id.
\textsuperscript{65} Alcohol taxes that came back to life after Prohibition ended were “designed to discourage the consumption of distilled spirits as contrasted with light wines and beer.” Report to the Secretary of the Treasury of Recommendations of Informal Interdepartmental Committee Relative to Taxation and Control of Alcoholic Beverages, Supplement to 1933 Hearings, supra note 9, at 331 [hereinafter “Interdepartmental Recommendations”].
\textsuperscript{67} Cheap fortified wines may be associated with winos rather than with moderate drinkers.
\textsuperscript{68} See Economics of Legalization, supra note 12, at 8.
\textsuperscript{69} The Staff of the California BOE was investigating a potency base before the defeat of Proposition 19: “Staff has discussed the possibility of using potency as a component of an excise tax scheme. Right now it is an option to consider . . . when and if marijuana is legalized, and the legislature moves to impose an excise tax. . . .

“With properly crafted legislation and sufficient resources staff believes it is doable.

“Staff agrees there are issues around testing and certification . . . that would need to be addressed to support a potency based tax. The question that goes with that is compliance. Legalization itself will move distribution from an underground economy to a regulated industry. Will the industry buy into that level of regulation? No one knows.” Email from BOE spokesperson Anita Gore to the author (Oct. 12, 2010, 8:24:16 p.m.), quoted in “Potency as a Base for a Tax on Marijuana — BOE,” available at http://newrevenue.org/2010/12/08/potency-as-a-base-for-a-tax-on-marijuana-boe/ [hereinafter “BOE Potency”].
The lab selects the two grams from some five to 15 sites in the two pounds. The subjectivity involved in choosing material from sites may not yield a replicable potency number that’s close enough for the government work of taxation.

Homogenization might yield a replicable result. But an adequately homogenized product could be so powdery that consumers might prefer what the bootlegger is selling.

Post-sale homogenization has been used to test cigarettes for tar and nicotine – but not for tax purposes. Independent buyers visit stores in 50 unannounced locations and buy packages of cigarettes. The buyers mail them in for homogenization and testing to a lab, whose results, brand by brand, are the average of the results of the purchased packs. But this testing is done by a private industry group: the only government involvement, aimed to prevent deceptive advertising, is occasional oversight by the Federal Trade Commission. That system does not seem rigorous enough to impose tax, and does not seem suited for the proliferation of brands that might accompany legalization.

Even if testing is accurate and replicable, it may cost too much. Some information on current prices is available. At a Colorado lab, “Prices currently range from $60-$75 per test, with steep discounts for volume.” Another lab says, “The whole process [involving gas chromatography, flame ionization, and mass spectrometry tests] costs $100 per sample.” Steep Hill Lab’s published price to two pounds of test flowers and concentrates is $120. No lab reveals its costs, which consist of fixed and variable elements, like machines (fixed) and labor (variable). Costs should come down with economies of scale – and with experience.

Even without a potency-based tax, industry might test for potency. Regulations might require that packages disclose THC content as a kind of warning or as ordinary consumer information. If so, the cost of testing could be attributable to the regulatory system. Even absent any tax or regulatory requirement, sellers might publicize content so consumers could comparison-shop; if so, consumer protection agencies might monitor sellers’ claims. Either of these independent reasons to test would weaken the argument that a potency-based system is too expensive. But

71 Tobacco buyers in the days of the chanting auctioneer of the Lucky Strike ads would bid in seconds, hardly breaking stride as they walked by a pile, by lifting leaves up to see what they were buying. The fungibility of tobacco in a particular pile was enough for an immediate evaluation.
75 Steep Hill Cannabis Analysis Laboratory, “Potency Analysis,” available at http://steephilllab.com/services/potency-analysis/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2010).
the issue of accuracy and replicability remains.

In a potency scheme, consumers will tend to favor tax-paid products displaying official government numbers over iffy competition from bootleggers, whom they can hardly sue for misrepresentation or worse.

Potency is the base in only the Massachusetts Bill among current proposals.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Retail Price or Gross Receipts}

States and localities now generally collect retail sales taxes on sales of legal medical marijuana. Like sales of shoes. That’s a starting point.

Gross receipts, as measured by sales, are the base of a tax on medical marijuana businesses in several California jurisdictions today.\textsuperscript{77} It applies in addition to the regular California sales tax.\textsuperscript{78}

In California, as in most states, “If there is a manufacturers' or importers' excise tax, such as excise taxes imposed on gasoline, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco, it is included as part of the sales and use tax base. Generally, both state and federal excise taxes are included in the sales and use tax base. For example, an individual who purchases gasoline in the State of California must pay sales tax on the retail price of the gasoline, including the state and federal excise tax.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} The text accompanying note 131, \textit{infra}, describes the proposal to use potency.

\textsuperscript{77} See Table 1, \textit{supra}. Gross receipts taxes may provide the opportunity for pyramiding of taxes on transfers within the supply chain.

\textsuperscript{78} States with sales taxes apply them to sales of marijuana. \textit{See} State Board of Equalization, “Special Notice: Information on Sales Tax and Registration for Medical Marijuana Sellers” (June 2007), \textit{available at} \url{http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/pdf/173.pdf}. Some argue that the BOE’s position applies to a null set, with the following reasoning: (1) California’s medical marijuana law does not allow sales of marijuana to patients. (2) Transfers are instead distributions from a cooperative. In a simple example, if two people finance, plant, tend, and harvest from a garden, the division of its fruits between them is not a sale. So (3) no sales tax is due. Operations paying sales taxes encounter this argument: “‘Almost all the dispensaries in California are illegal,’ said William Panzer, an Oakland lawyer who helped draft Proposition 215. ‘They’re sole proprietorships, not collectives.’” Jesse McKinley, “Don’t Call It ‘Pot’ in This Circle; It’s a Profession,” \textit{The New York Times} (Apr. 23, 2010), \textit{available at} \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/24pot.html}. One non-lawyer, meanwhile, takes this view: “The organization should get a state seller[’]s permit [and] pay sales tax on the net value of the member investment after costs, even though it is not a sale.” Richard Johnson, “Richard’s Legal Guide For Growers” (Jun. 11, 2010), \textit{available at} \url{http://www.mendocinocountry.com/independent/1cannabis/richardsguidetogrowers.html} (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). Despite its internal inconsistency and blow to the bottom line, that view avoids a fight and could gain an official ally.

\textsuperscript{79} California State Assembly publication \textit{available at} \url{http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c21/publications/Reference_Book/2008/Chapter_2E.pdf} (last visited March 25, 2011).
Some states do not include excise taxes in the retail tax base. A variation on that approach is to exempt transactions from sales or use tax, but then to tax them at retail at a percentage greater than that imposed on standard items. This kind of higher, separately stated tax applies to services like lodging and car rentals in many localities.

Should jurisdictions choose a retail price base? Let’s assume potency is the ideal tax base; that it can’t be measured accurately enough for tax purposes; but that consumers pay more for potent products. Under those assumptions, retail price reflects potency. So a tax based on retail price would be a proxy for one based on potency.

But retail price may reflect other factors other than potency. These include branding and convenience of the retail location.

A taxed based on price can reduce regressivity. (Taxing sales of products other than luxuries -- as opposed to taxing income or property -- tends to be regressive.) Regressivity decreases if fancy products bear more tax than basic products. If products of identical weight and potency sell for different pre-tax prices, a tax based on price looks like a luxury tax or a revenue raiser; a tax based on weight pushes cost-conscious buyers toward the cheaper alternative: It seems simply to discourage consumption.80 But to the extent that “the harm caused by a unit . . . is unrelated to its price,”81 a tax based on retail price misses taxing what citizens are mad at.

A retail price base creates opportunities for evasion, because it allows much untaxed marijuana into the community before a retail sale takes place. That is, it creates uncertainty about whether tax will be paid.82

Basing a tax on sales price has one unique advantage. This article dwells on the necessity of letting government authorities adjust the tax burden nimbly, so as to respond quickly to competition from bootleggers. A price tax base provides some automatic response to bootleggers. If bootleggers cut prices, prices should fall in the legal market to compete. With a

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80 Recently, though, the American Lung Association has opposed efforts of some producers of smokeless tobacco to shift its federal tax base from wholesale price to weight. American Lung Association, “Factsheet: Taxation of Smokeless Tobacco: Percentage of Price vs. Net Weight,” available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0175.pdf (last visited October 12, 2010). That opposition arises because the weight-based tax is not indexed, so it will decrease in real terms over time. For a more thorough comparison of ad valorem taxes (such as sales taxes) and specific taxes (such as those based on weight) see Sijbren Cnossen and Michael Smart, “Taxation of Tobacco,” in Theory and Practice, supra note 11, at 38-41.
82 See text accompanying note 244, infra.
A price base, a price cut by legitimate operators will result in a bigger immediate tax cut – which will put more pressure on bootleggers by putting less pressure on legitimate operators.

For instance, if the pre-tax legal price is $200 per ounce, we could get a tax of $100 with either a 50 percent tax or a $100 per ounce tax – for an after tax price of $300. If bootleggers offer a competitive price of $200 in a weight tax environment, legal operators would have to cut their price drastically, to $100 pre-tax ($200 after tax), to compete. (This example ignores the inherently higher value of legal product.) In a price tax environment, the competitive price would still be $200 after tax, made up of $133 pre-tax price and $67 tax. That relative stability for legal producers is a good thing, because it allows for stable business planning – and higher prices in case of a price war.

**A Combination of Approaches**

The European Union uses a “greater of” approach: “excise duties levied on cigarettes must account for at least 57% of price, and must be at least €64 per 1000 cigarettes.” The federal tax on large cigars uses a “lesser of” approach: it is 52.75 percent of the sales price but not more than $402.60 per 1,000 units.

A marijuana tax scheme could follow the EU in combining approaches. It is possible to use all three of the factors weight, potency, and percentage of sale price. But to the extent that potency and price are correlated, weight and one other factor would be plenty.

**Square Footage or Number of Plants**

A price base doesn’t work for nonprofits that are exempt from gross receipts tax – or for home-growers who don’t sell. And jurisdictions need lead time and resources to tax by weight or potency. So for marijuana operations, California cities are trying another tax base.

That other base could not be specific, high ad valorem property taxes, because an old California voter initiative, Proposition 13, caps all property taxes at one percent. So localities have developed a work-around: they tax not the value of property, but its square footage. The tax rate varies with the property’s use: Ordinary commercial property usually bears a higher rate than residential property. And property used in the marijuana business bears even higher rates.

Most of the square footage marijuana taxes are $25 per square foot; most apply to all business space, owned or rented. Following local models, the taxes typically count not only all interior

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84 I.R.C. section 5701(a)(2).

space such as hallways but also “garages, carports, [and] porches.” These taxes may create strange incentives: Taxing office space, for example, might lead taxpayers to source back office and other work at home, at a coffee shop, or to a third party provider.

This fallback approach seems crude for another reason: Square footage of business space does not seem tightly correlated with the intoxication that the public is mad at. But if you can’t tax exactly what needs taxing, you can tax a proxy. The United States would like to tax the net income of offshore insurance companies selling policies here, but we can’t measure it. So Code section 4371 puts a 4-percent excise tax on gross premiums that U.S. persons pay to them.

Instead of measuring all business space, Rancho Cordova targets its tax: It counts just grow areas, hydroponic or natural, with an alternate base of number of plants. On indoor operations, the highest rate is the greater of $900 per square foot or $900 per plant. On outdoor operations, the highest rate is the greater of $900 per 12.5 square feet, that is, $72 per square foot, or $900 per plant. Measuring grow areas is more intrusive and less verifiable than measuring business space.

An analogy for this more targeted square footage taxes is not chickens before they hatch, but the size of the coop. A tax on grow areas could target intoxication somewhat better by counting not just square footage, but also the number of crops produced in a year.

A square footage taxes avoids valuation disputes, but that makes it cruder. The tax applies at the very beginning of the supply chain, so it minimizes the problem of post-tax leakage. And unlike an excise tax based on weight or potency, or a property tax requiring valuation, it requires little lead-time to implement.

Indexing

The easiest question in this article is whether to index dollar amounts. The answer is yes. Dollar terms are part of any tax based on weight or potency; unless the rate is indexed, it freezes the nominal tax burden -- and reduces the inflation-adjusted tax burden. (Indexing is irrelevant when the tax base is a percentage of price, because as prices go up, taxes do, too.) But none of the pending statewide proposals indexes for inflation. Indexing is common in the income tax; it

86 Long Beach Resolution, supra note 42.
87 Rancho Cordova Ordinance, supra note 42.
88 Indexing of dollar amounts in a tax scheme is of paramount importance these days. See Kenneth J. Kies in Forty Years of Change, One Constant: Tax Analysts, Dec. 27, 2010, p. 15 [hereinafter “Forty Years”]; see also James Wetzler in id. p. 24, available at http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/website.nsf/Web/40thAnniversary/$file/TA_40Yr.pdf. Kies and Wetzler point to the revolutionary impact on tax policy of indexing rate brackets, exemption amounts, and the like. That impact kept taxes steady in nominal terms but down in real terms; indexing excises keeps taxes steady in nominal terms but up in real terms.
is rare (too rare) in excise taxes. The City of Long Beach, California, indexes its square footage taxes on marijuana businesses. Good idea.

What Rate?

With a subject and tax base identified, the next question is rates. Economics provides no clear answers, so history and analogy may help. The discussion that follows mostly uses weight as the tax base, but the same kind of analysis would apply to potency, price, or any other base.

When the taxes on alcohol were re-imposed after the repeal of Prohibition, the legislation was “inevitably a work of hopeful ignorance. No one had a solid foundation to analyze what the tax should be, or what revenues might be reasonably expected.”

Similarly, today, with marijuana, uncertainty prevails about elasticity of demand, street price, responses of bootleggers, and much more. Proposition 19, criticized here for punting to localities, at least acknowledged the difficulty of setting a rate by setting no rate at all.

Starting with Street Price

A tax rate might aim to keep marijuana’s street price steady, or higher. Legalizers are not asking for a price cut. People who are mad at marijuana might want an increase.

90 See Table 1, supra.
92 One analysis indicated that the pre-tax retail price of legalized cannabis could be as low as $2 per ounce in 1994 dollars. See Economics of Legalization, supra note 12. Street prices then were in the $100 to $600 range. The analysis suggested a tax rate of about $500 to $1,000 per ounce of THC content, or some 50 cents to a dollar per joint, in 1994 dollars. That rate was said to make the market pay what it would bear, and would have produced a post-tax price of roughly $75 to $150 per ounce.

Data on street prices is available. A federal site lists prices between $75 and $400 per ounce in one-ounce quantities. The Rand Corporation estimates a street price in California for sinsemilla-grade marijuana of $250–$400 per ounce. Unofficial web sites, too, list purported street prices. But maybe incentives for law enforcers lead them to overstate the value of their seizures. Meanwhile, in states where medical marijuana is legal, leakage to non-medical users should create more supply and drive prices down.

A tax rate that maintains the current street price would let a state attempt to soak up the “prohibition premium,” which is the above-normal return that arises from the risk of getting caught. But a Rand Corporation study suggests that tax rates maintaining the current price would be so high as to be counter-productive. That is, bootleggers would triumphantly undercut the tax-paid price, and consumers would largely prefer the cheaper, riskier product.

Balancing Revenue and Compliance

Matching street price may be a weak proxy for rate setters’ two principal goals. One goal is to set a rate high enough to maximize net revenue. The other is to set the rate low enough to make compliance high and bootlegging rare. President Roosevelt’s group designing re-imposition of taxes on alcohol in 1933 put it this way: “Recommendations have been designed to eliminate the organized illegal liquor industry. . . . [R]ates of excise tax were calculated to yield maximum revenue without necessitating a price to the ultimate consumer of legal basic

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548929. But given a tradition of distrust of government, not all will agree. The coalition of “bootleggers and Baptists” who supported alcohol Prohibition has its current counterparts.


95 Altered State, supra note 8, at 17, quoting an earlier figure of $300-$450. That type “would likely predominate in the legalization scenarios [the authors] believe most likely.” The slightly lower $250-$400 range comes from an e-mail from Beau Kilmer, Co-Director, RAND Drug Policy Research Center, to the author (Dec. 1, 2010, 6:30:25 p.m.) (on file with author).


98 Altered State, supra note 8, at 47-48.

99 This leaves aside the goal of discouraging consumption.

100 A.B. 2254’s approach of seeking only enough revenue for drug treatment does not seek to maximize revenue.

alcoholic beverages . . . high enough to enable the illegal product to compete.”

Deciding whether bootlegging is rare enough is a matter of opinion, except in extreme cases, such as when a tax is so high that few choose to pay it, or so low as to produce negligible revenue. A jurisdiction may choose to sacrifice revenue, even in the long term, to keep bootlegging at a subjectively acceptable level.

If marijuana is legal and taxed, current bootleggers and new businesses may choose to operate legally, illegally, or not at all. The tax rate is a key element of a potential bootlegger’s analysis in deciding whether to compete illegally against a tax paid product. The framers of post-Prohibition alcohol taxes were so nervous about a price war against bootleggers that they urged the legal alcohol industry voluntarily to “forego excessive profits.” The potential bootlegger of any substance would consider factors beyond price, like the likelihood and consequences of getting caught, consumer preference for legal products, and the burden of compliance. In a game-like or circular way, tax writers would consider the bootlegger’s analysis in setting rates.

Lessons from Alcohol

Tax writers in years gone by looked at excise tax rates as a percentage of cost of manufacture, which did not include distribution and selling costs. When a $2.00 per gallon tax amounted to eight to 12 times the “average cost of manufacture” of whiskey in the Civil War, bootlegging ran rampant. A reduction in that tax by 75 percent in 1868, to two or three times the cost of manufacture, “practically stopped illicit distillation” and more than doubled revenues from the tax. Two times the cost of manufacture was a rough standard used in the re-imposition of tax after passage of the 21st Amendment, too. Whiskey then thought to cost $1.00 or a little more

References:

102 Interdepartmental Recommendations, supra note 65.
104 Report to the Secretary of the Treasury of Findings of Fact and Law of the Informal Interdepartmental Committee Relative to Taxation and Control of Alcoholic Beverages, Supplement to 1933 Hearings, supra note 9, 304, 308 [hereinafter “Interdepartmental Findings”].
105 See State and Federal, supra note 6, at 232.
106 See BOE Potency, supra note 69.
107 “[O]ne would expect the extent of tax evasion to be affected to some degree by mechanics of the tax’s design, collection, and enforcement, as well as its size. Hence, it would seem prudent for jurisdictions contemplating imposing marijuana taxes of this magnitude to invest substantial energy in crafting wisely the particulars of those mechanics.” Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., “Smuggling and Excise Tax Evasion for Legalized Marijuana” 7 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2010/RAND_WR766.pdf [hereinafter “Smuggling”].
108 Hu, supra note 19, at 42.
109 Id. States in that era imposed license fees rather than gallonage taxes.
per proof gallon to produce\textsuperscript{110} bore a federal tax of $2.00\textsuperscript{111} with the understanding that state taxes would add to the final price to the consumer.

Analyzing alcohol taxes as a percentage of retail price would help, but good data are hard to come by. The liquor lobby estimates federal and state taxes at 39 percent of the retail price of spirits nationally,\textsuperscript{112} but the Rand Corporation says Federal and state excises amount to just 11 percent of the price in California.\textsuperscript{113} An alcohol watchdog group says excise taxes make up 11 percent of the retail price for beer.\textsuperscript{114} Those rates seem low compared to those in other countries. “Across [22] countries in [a] sample, the unweighted mean tax burden [“as a percentage of retail price”] on beer was 35 percent[;] . . . for wine . . . 30 percent[;] . . . and for spirits 61 percent."\textsuperscript{115}

**Lessons from Tobacco**

Tobacco taxes often make up a significant part of what consumers pay for the product.\textsuperscript{116} In

\textsuperscript{110} That was the statement of Lovell H. Parker, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, about the price of good quality, 100 proof whisky. 1933 Hearings, supra note 9, at 11. Various witnesses had different estimates of the average cost of production; $1.20 was the figure supplied by a Mr. Lourie of the Tariff Commission. *Id.* at 83.


\textsuperscript{112} Federal taxes were said to take up 18 percent of a consumer’s price; state and local taxes take up 21 percent, but that presumably includes sales taxes; and “indirect” taxes, including “personal income, corporate income, payroll and property taxes,” take up 20 percent. Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, “Excessive Tax Burden, Distilled Spirits, 2005, United States,” available at [http://www.discus.org/pdf/2005bottle.pdf#xml=http://search.americaneagle.com/discus/index.asp?cmd=pdfhits&DocId=997&Index=p%3adSearch/discus&HitCount=1&hits=b+&hc=-23&req=property](http://www.discus.org/pdf/2005bottle.pdf#xml=http://search.americaneagle.com/discus/index.asp?cmd=pdfhits&DocId=997&Index=p%3adSearch/discus&HitCount=1&hits=b+&hc=-23&req=property) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). Those indirect taxes are of the kind borne by businesses and consumers generally, and they are not part of the standard analysis.

\textsuperscript{113} Smuggling, supra note 107, Table 1, at 4.


California, state cigarette excise taxes are 87 cents and federal taxes are $1.01 per pack (a proxy for weight). One study, excluding sales tax, estimates that excises alone there amount to 47 percent of the after-tax price and 89 percent of the pre-tax price. This tax burden does not include the some $246 billion that tobacco companies pay states over a 27-year period under the Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement.

California’s tobacco tax is soft compared to other states, and Europe taxes cigarettes ferociously. Total European taxes, including Value Added Taxes, reportedly make up at least 70 percent (in Luxembourg) and as much as 90 percent (in The U.K.) of the after-tax retail price. In other words, in Luxembourg, the tax is 233 percent of pre-tax retail price; in The U.K., it’s 900 percent. So in The U.K., growers, distributors, and retailers get 10 pence of every pound spent on cigarettes; 90 pence go to taxes.

Most domestic evasion of tobacco taxes involves products purchased legally in one jurisdiction then resold in another. That is, smugglers sell packages that look and feel official, because they comply with the packaging rules in the low-tax jurisdiction where they were originally sold. So rate-setting must involve consideration of taxes in other jurisdictions.

In addition to cross-border smuggling, weak governments may face clandestine local operators: “in Pakistan’s tribal areas,” some of them Al Qaeda-infested, “the problem of illicit sales stems largely from small-scale manufacturers . . . that are not paying taxes on the cigarettes they sell, or

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117 Smuggling, supra note 107, Table 1 at 4. Meanwhile, “[t]he average price for a pack of cigarettes nationwide is roughly $5.51 (including statewide sales taxes but not local cigarette or sales taxes, other than NYC’s $1.50 per pack cigarette tax)” as of 2010. Eric Lindblom, “State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings” (August 3, 2010), available at http://www.tobaccofreenkids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf.


119 Cigarette Taxes, supra note 44.


121 Matthew C. Farrelly et al., “State Cigarette Excise Taxes: Implications for Revenue and Tax Evasion” 2 (May 2003), available at http://www.ri.org/pubs/8742_excise_taxes_fr_5-03.pdf. And here is an example, from afar: “Paraguay, a low-tax country, manufactures more cigarettes per year than its population could hope to smoke in a lifetime. The majority of its exports are reportedly sold illegally in Brazil. Of course, part of this could be attributed to corruption—Paraguay ranks near the bottom on Transparency International’s notorious Corruption Perceptions Index, and some politicians have indeed been implicated in the illegal cigarette trade. But the root of the problem clearly lies elsewhere: Without Brazil’s 80 percent cigarette tax rate, there would be little incentive to break the law.” Taco Tuinstra, “An Inconvenient Truth,” Tobacco Reporter Magazine (April 2008), available at http://www.tobaccoimporter.com/home.php?id=119&cid=4&article_id=10847.

at least are not paying the full level of taxes due.”

An Initial Rate for Marijuana

Illegal production of marijuana varies by state, though it may reach nowhere the level of alcohol bootlegging at the time of the repeal of Prohibition, when “the illegal industry [was] entrenched, organized, and efficient.”

A.B. 2254 would tax sales of marijuana at $50 an ounce. But that bill aims only to fund drug education and rehab programs, so a board would reduce the rate to match the needs of those programs. As a percentage of the current street price of contraband, that $50 per ounce is in the low double digits.

If legalization drives pre-tax prices down, though, $50 per ounce takes up a bigger portion of total price to the consumer. A Rand study estimates that 58.6 percent of the final price would go to pay taxes. Taxes would amount to 207 percent of the producer’s costs: that’s in the range of the percentage found sustainable for liquor by 1868, and near the percentage Congress imposed on liquor in 1934.

But marijuana is harder to tax than liquor, so the 58.6 percent of final price the Rand study foresees may be too high. An oft-cited study suggests an upper limit of 50 percent of final price, and uses a more modest 25 percent of final price as a basis for analysis.

To complete the discussion of rates by turning to a potency base, the Massachusetts Bill sets the following:

$250 per ounce of marijuana if THC content is 10% or more;

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124 Interdepartmental Findings, supra note 104, at 307.
125 See text accompanying note 95, supra.
126 That figure includes sales taxes. Altered State, supra note 8, at 20-21. A typical producer would receive only some 28.3 percent (including profit) of the final price that the consumer pays. Retailers and distributors make the total add up to 100 percent.
127 See text accompanying note 109, supra.
128 See text accompanying note 111, supra. That 1934 percentage was in the range of 167 percent ($2.00/$1.20) or 200 percent ($2.00/$1.00).
129 A Rand study argues that the proposed rate is too high. “As compared with other familiar excise taxes, a $50 per ounce excise tax on marijuana is either very high or truly unprecedented depending on the metric employed. . . . California should not rule out the possibility that tax evasion would wipe out essentially all of the potential revenues from a $50 per ounce excise tax.” Smuggling, supra note 107, at 7.
131 Supra note 3.
$200 per ounce if THC content is as much as 5% but less than 10%;
$150 per ounce if THC content is more than 1% and less than 5%.

A board could adjust those rates up or down, to maximize revenue and to prevent bootlegging. In an apparent bow to street price, the Massachusetts bill’s discontinuous scale reverses the pattern of the federal tax on beverage alcohol, which taxes hard liquor more per ounce of pure alcohol, for example, than it taxes beer: the Massachusetts bill tends to reduce the tax per unit of intoxicant as the potency goes up.

**Adjusting Rates**

Any new tax scheme is likely to need fine-tuning, or even wholesale rewriting. Decades ago, the story goes, Congressional staff discovered a loophole that one industry was using and drafted a proposal to close it. Estimators assigned a billion-dollar revenue gain to the proposal; Congress adopted it; the industry got around it. Then staff came up with a new plan to close the loophole and raise that same billion dollars, and the cycle would repeat.

Maybe that story is apocryphal, but starting to tax a product whose market has sought the shadows is likely to produce lots of new and fresh ideas and some especially spectacular blunders. In the price war with bootleggers that will inevitably follow legalization, tax writers will probably start by setting too high a rate that encourages bootlegging, or too low a rate that leaves revenue on the table.

Even if tax writers set the best possible rate, bootleggers will react to and take advantage of it if it is static. Bootleggers will know the market better than tax-writers, at least at first, and they tend to be more entrepreneurial, more flexible, and less risk-averse than government. A tax mechanism providing nimble tweaking from the outset will facilitate trial and shorten the pain of error.

Then, as legal competition weakens bootlegging, jurisdictions should be able to raise rates over time. Indexing is not sufficient for this task. While the Rand study “Altered State?” views the rate of tax evasion as an unknown, it does not focus on the possibility that the rate of evasion would be dynamic rather than static. But taxing authorities could drive the rate of evasion down over time by fighting and winning a price war against bootleggers.

That’s what happened with the re-imposition of federal taxes on beverage alcohol in 1934 after repeal of Prohibition in 1933. When policymakers discussed “post-repeal liquor taxation, . . . [i]t

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132 One idea in 1933 to deal with the foreseeable and gradual elimination of the bootlegger was to codify a tax rate that rose over time. 1933 Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Harry L. Lourie of the Tariff Commission staff, suggesting a tax of $1.10 per proof gallon in the first year and $2.20 in the second year). But a deferred higher rate would have incentivized the bootlegger to hold inventory to compete against higher tax-paid prices. Id. at 33 (statement of Joseph H. Choate, Jr., of the Federal Alcohol Control Administration).

133 Supra note 8.
was generally agreed that the immediate objective should be directed to the elimination of the bootlegger.”\textsuperscript{134} Maximizing revenue could wait. “For framers of the new tax measure . . . , the central task was to arrive at a tax rate low enough to enable the legal industry to undersell the illegal industry and yet high enough to give a satisfactory return to the government.”\textsuperscript{135}

President Roosevelt’s team put it this way:

The illegal industry must make a substantially higher gross and net profit on its sales than the legal industry. If it does not, it will not be profitable to run the risks involved. . . . As between legal and illegal products of substantially similar price the buying public will have greater confidence in and will prefer to buy the legal product.

It seems reasonable to suppose that a more drastic price competition by the legal industry will be necessary in the early post-prohibition period while the illegal industry is still organized and well financed. It would probably require a considerably higher price to revive a defeated illegal industry then it would to keep a well entrenched one in business. This price could be facilitated by keeping the tax burden on legal alcoholic beverages comparatively low in the earlier post-prohibition period in order to permit the legal industry to offer more severe competition to its illegal competitor. When that competitor has been driven from business the tax burden could be gradually increased. Investigators . . . estimate that it will require three years of such competition to break the organization of the illegal industry.\textsuperscript{136}

As the re-imposers of alcohol taxes hoped, bootlegging faded fast. “The syndicated type of illicit operation was virtually destroyed by the end of 1937, and since that time the control of production and distribution of illegal distilled spirits became largely a problem of coping with relatively small violators.”\textsuperscript{137}

Quickly, legitimate business moved in to take the bootlegger’s place. “[O]nce it ceased to be outlawed, the alcohol industry was no longer dominated by unregulated, illicit entrepreneurs. . . . The leaders of the major alcohol industries are members of the economic establishment with an investment in maintaining order and obedience to law. . . . Now [in 1991], over a half-century since prohibition, it is easy to forget that all this was the outcome of self-conscious public policy and not the ‘natural’ result of market forces or national zeitgeist.”\textsuperscript{138}

The tax increases that the framers of the 1934 tax envisioned were indeed gradual at first. Congress increased the 1934 rate on liquor, $2.00 per proof gallon, to $2.25 per proof gallon in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{134} Hu, \textit{supra} note 19, at 73.
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at 75.
\textsuperscript{136} Interdepartmental Findings, \textit{supra} note 104, at 308-09.
\textsuperscript{137} Hu, \textit{supra} note 19, at 95. Hu goes on: “Mash seizures provides [sic] a fairly reliable index of illegal production. It is significant that this series showed a drop of 65 percent between 1935 and 1938. \textit{Id.} at 96.
\textsuperscript{138} Lessons, \textit{supra} note 14.
\end{flushright}
mi1938 and to $3.00 in 1940. Then World War II changed everything. In 1942, the rate rose to $6.00; in 1944, to $9.00. That increase was 450 percent (414 percent in real terms) within 12 years.

An even earlier example shows the need for flexibility when first taxing a drug. James I of England took years to make needed adjustments (with 12 pence (d.) per shilling (s.)):

James I’s abhorrence of tobacco is well known, and it is not surprising to find that he should select tobacco to bear a very heavy duty. In 1602 he charged a special impost of 6s. 6d. [78d.] per pound on all imported tobacco. Prior to this date it had been charged at 2d. per pound as ‘other merchandise not specially mentioned’. The effect of this high duty was a vast increase in smuggling. . . .In 1620 the duty was reduced to 1s. [that is, 12d.] per pound, and it was decreed that all tobacco should bear a government stamp.

James’s failed rate was 39 times higher than the original rate, and 6.5 times higher than the ultimate rate. The tax then was a customs duty, not an excise tax, but the lesson applies: the first try can be really wrong.

The Massachusetts Bill creates a board that can adjust statutory rates up or down. A.B. 2254 allows for only reductions of the statutory rate – and only annually. A one-way ratchet seems less than ideal. Allowing only one tweak per year, meanwhile, makes for predictability, but not for nimbleness.

An individual can react more nimbly than a board, so an official could be charged to regulate commerce in and to collect revenue from legalized marijuana. Elected Insurance Commissioners in some states are responsible for protecting the public and, by capping rates, establishing the price the consumer pays. An appointed or elected official could influence the after-tax price of marijuana by changing the tax rate from time to time.

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139 All the rates come from Ripy, supra note 111, at 14, Appendix B.
140 Cumulative inflation between the imposition of the $2 tax in January 1933 and the imposition of the $9 tax in April 1944 was 35.66 percent. “Inflation Calculator,” available at http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Calculators/Inflation_Calculator.asp#calcresults (enter the appropriate months) (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
141 Graham Smith, Something to Declare: 1000 Years of Customs and Excise 10 (London: Harrap 1980).
142 Supra note 3, section 10.
143 Supra note 2, section 33 (proposed statutory section 34032). The 2010 voter initiative in the City of Berkeley, California, to impose taxes on marijuana allows the City Council to eliminate or reduce them at any time. Berkeley Ordinance, supra note 42, section 3. Hu, supra note 18, is vehement about providing transition rules when rates change (in his discussions of floor stocks taxes, passim).
145 Beyond the scope of this article is the question, for legislatures, whether to empower a more nimble governmental authority to speedily ban, or even to regulate and tax, designer drugs like “K2, or ‘fake marijuana,’ which is essentially a legal, smokable form of psychoactive potpourri.” The quotation is from Mary Carmichael, “Fake-Pot Panic,” Newsweek (March 4, 2010), available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/03/fake-pot-panic.html.
Although delegating power to set liquor prices in state-owned stores or lottery prices is routine, delegating power to set tax rates seems unlegislative or extraordinary. But legislatures could sunset the delegation and regain the power to set rates after a set time for experimentation and for flushing out bootleggers. Compared to ceding power to choose or change the tax base, ceding rate-setting power is more circumscribed and should be more acceptable.

Cliffs

Discontinuities or cliffs occur when some incremental changes in the amount that the tax base measures result in a tax change that is disproportionate (and when other changes in the amount measured result in no change in tax).

We still use a cliff to tax wine. At 14 percent alcohol (the threshold for “fortified” wine), the federal tax per bottle jumps from 21 cents to 31 cents, rounded. Maybe that’s why a lot of wine has 13.9 percent alcohol.

Sometimes, the rationale for cliffs is clear. Before reform to a continuous ad valorem percentage method, the federal cigar tax was based on seven price ranges. Each range had its own specific tax stamp. Those brackets were needed to “keep to a reasonable level the number and denomination of stamps that had to be printed.”

This problem of cliffs is not restricted to excises. Comic book character Scrooge McDuck once became exasperated when an incremental penny of income pushed him into a higher tax bracket. Even today, with rounding, an incremental penny of income can produce as much as $14 of extra federal tax.

In the Massachusetts Bill, an ounce of marijuana with 10 percent THC content would bear a tax of $250; an ounce with 9.9 percent THC content would bear a tax of only $200. An ounce with 5.1 percent THC content would bear that same tax of $200. That’s arbitrary. A smooth, percentage based rate solves this problem.


148 See text accompanying note 131, supra.
What License Fees?

Growers and Sellers

The City of Oakland has enacted an annual fee of $211,000 for each of four “marijuana factories.” Proposals that predate that ordinance lack its ambition. The Massachusetts Bill would charge $500 for a cultivator’s license, $1,000 for a processing license, $3,000 for a trade license for transporters, warehouses, wholesalers, and distributors, and $2,000 for retailers. A.B. 2254 would charge up to $5,000 each for a cultivator’s, manufacturer’s, and wholesaler’s license the first year and $2,500 each later year. There would be no fee for retailers.

A thorough approach is to impose fees for licenses on everyone in the supply chain, including, in conformity with evolving international standards for tobacco retailers. The amounts could be substantial. Not only would licensing create a revenue source, it would also help keep track of tax paid marijuana. Making licenses expensive or otherwise restricting them narrows the supply chain at a possible choke point. Lower fees for small businesses are a complication, but are common.

Consumers

Mark A.R. Kleiman, who wrote a book on drug policy, says:

   Personal drug licensure, particularly with quantity limitations, seems to represent a wild, even Orwellian, extension of government meddling in private life if we apply it to alcohol or tobacco. By contrast, as applied to currently illicit drugs such a system looks like a virtually complete legalization.

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151 State and Federal, supra note 6, at 236.

152 Lower fees are a dime a dozen. See, e.g., City of Seattle Department of Executive Administration, “Licensing Information,” available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/rca/licenses/Blicform.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010). See also City of Santa Monica, “Business License Tax and Fee Summary,” available at http://www01.smgov.net/finance/licenses/pdf/feesum2page.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2010). Graduated license fees are not a new and fresh idea. See Hu, supra note 19, at 119 et seq.

In many cases, individuals have to pay for a license before they can buy something.\footnote{154}{Sweden tried individual drinking licenses in the early 20th century before abandoning the idea. Daniel Okrent, \textit{Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition} 75 (New York: Scribner 2010). This book, a page-turner, goes into the politics of the repeal of Prohibition. It says that a statement that without the need for revenue “we would not have had Repeal for at least ten years” “may have been right.” \textit{Id.} at 361.} A young-looking person needs to pay for a driver’s license or other official photo ID card before buying alcohol. Those cards don’t cost extra for the purchasing privilege, but they aren’t free. More to the point, Holland announced plans in May 2011 to charge a license fee for users to consume marijuana in cafes.\footnote{155}{Associated Press, “Dutch Cabinet Commits to Anti-Marijuana Plan” (May 27, 2011), \textit{available at} http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/05/27/world/europe/AP-EU-Netherlands-Marijuana.html?hp.} In the United States, many states charge patients fees to be able to buy medical marijuana. Colorado charges a $90 fee; Michigan charges $100; California charges $66, and counties there may charge extra.\footnote{156}{“How to Get a Medical Marijuana Card,” \textit{available at} http://www.mahalo.com/how-to-get-a-medical-marijuana-card (last visited Dec. 11, 2010) [hereinafter “Medical Card”]. States are changing their access fees frequently, so this is a moving target.} Some of those states reduce fees, but usually not to zero, for patients receiving means-based government health care assistance.

Requiring licenses to purchase will not seal the system. Even if purchasers need a license, an intoxicant could find its way to folks without licenses through straw-person buyers, in the way that teenagers without fake IDs lurk near convenience stores in hopes of finding someone who will buy them beer. Too high a price for a license will lead to straw transactions.

Licenses to possess marijuana make little sense. States now realize some revenue by selling licenses for fishing and hunting, which are inherently observable. Possession of marijuana is not.


To be theoretically complete, a sliding-scale fee for individual licenses to purchase marijuana could achieve some progressivity. That scale could have a minimum fee, like those imposed on applicants for medical marijuana. And it could have a maximum, so the super-wealthy couldn’t beat the system by sending agents to do the purchasing.\footnote{158}{The high Scandinavian traffic ticket fines are involuntary, and provide no model for an optional consumer’s license. Deciding the ratio of the minimum to the maximum would be necessary. For example, sliding scales for mental health care in Brooklyn show ratios below 1:7. They are, at various providers, $19-$95, $25-$90, $25-$35, $30-$185, 0-$30 (ratio meaningless), $35-$95, and $50-$100. Personal Counseling [Department], Brooklyn College, “Mental Health Hotlines and Resources” (Apr. 2005), \textit{available at} http://pc.brooklyn.cuny.edu/Hotlines.htm.} Sweden, Finland, and other countries
fine traffic violators on the basis of income, so high earners pay higher fines than others.\textsuperscript{159} Those countries, though, are relaxed about income tax information; America is not ready to disclose people’s incomes to agencies outside revenue services.\textsuperscript{160}

**What Special Breaks?**

An excise tax aims mainly at collecting revenue or at discouraging something we’re mad at. But special rules may find their way into the tax law to benefit or burden activities or classes of taxpayers or to make the law more administrable.

**Small or Large Businesses**

Today, special tax rates favor small alcohol producers.\textsuperscript{161} For example, the general federal rate for beer is $18 per 31 gallon barrel, but brewers who produce less than 2 million barrels annually pay only $7 per barrel on the first 60,000 barrels.\textsuperscript{162} More help may be on the way: S. 3339, sponsored by 17 Senators, would set excise taxes at $3.50 per barrel for the first 60,000 barrels and $16 for the next 1,940,000 barrels for any brewer producing not more than 6 million barrels in a year.\textsuperscript{163}

A similar rule benefits wine businesses that produce no more than a quarter million gallons a year: they get a drastically reduced tax rate on the first 100,000 gallons.\textsuperscript{164} For wine, at least, there is no cliff: the benefits phase out gradually.\textsuperscript{165}

Small growers might benefit from customs duties on imported marijuana.

Some view with alarm the prospect of big corporations taking over the marijuana trade. One argument back is that big corporations are more reliable taxpayers because they want to protect their reputations and won’t fly by night. That argument may be generally accurate, though a watchdog group alleges many “examples of cigarette company complicity in cigarette


\textsuperscript{160} To exhaust the options for progressivity, a scheme to base the cost of a purchaser’s license on the official valuation of the applicant’s dwelling or total property in the state makes no sense. Renters, trusts, joint owners, and out-of-state second home owners doom it.

\textsuperscript{161} The federal government has also resisted vertical integration of the beverage alcohol business by generally forbidding common ownership of producers, middlemen, and retailers. See the “Tied House” rules of 27 C.F.R. Part 6, 27 C.F.R section 6.1 et seq. .

\textsuperscript{162} I.R.C. section 5051.


\textsuperscript{164} I.R.C. section 5041(c).

\textsuperscript{165} See id. section 5041(c)(2), which provides for a gradually diminishing credit and thus an increasing tax rate as production passes the quarter-million gallon mark.
smuggling.”

Still, the ease of tax administration militates for a concentrated industry with few taxpayers, and appears to be the rationale behind Berkeley’s lower square footage tax rate for nonprofit operations with over 3,000 square feet of space. But Berkeley limits facilities to 30,000 square feet, much smaller than the industrial scale operations allowed in nearby Oakland. Berkeley’s overall scheme aims to serve the additional purpose of encouraging existing dispensaries and cultivators, who have generally not caused problems locally, to open licensed cultivation facilities.

**Environmentally Friendly Operations**

Some indoor grow houses have reportedly taken some 180 gallons of diesel fuel to produce one pound of marijuana. “At indoor grow sites, Humboldt County environmental officials report finding tubs of used anti-freeze, leaking fuel lines, pesticide containers and nutrient-laden potting soil that runs off into streams during rains, feeding algae blooms that suffocate fish.”

A tax scheme could favor marijuana grown outdoors, using the natural light of the sun over that grown indoors, in energy- and water-intensive grow houses. Rancho Cordova voters set a precedent for differential rates in 2010. A rate as high as $900 now applies to each square foot of indoor cultivated area or each indoor plant; outdoors, the top rate is $72 ($900 per 12.5 square feet or per plant). The rationale for that difference is not concern for the environment, though: it reflects a judgment that growers can produce 12.5 times more plants in a given space indoors than outdoors.

In deciding whether to grow outdoors, producers would consider not just differential tax rates, but also factors such as different costs for farmland as opposed to buildings and different costs for security needed to prevent theft.

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167 Berkeley Ordinance, supra note 42.


169 Id.

170 Rancho Cordova Ordinance, supra note 42.

171 The tax base outdoors is the greater of the actual area used or 12.5 square feet per plant; indoors, it’s the greater of the actual area used or one square foot per plant. Id.

172 An application for a Rhode Island medical marijuana business permit illustrates the commercial value of untaxed marijuana: the applicant’s “building is already equipped with bullet-proof glass and three time-lock vaults which makes it ideal for establishing a Compassion Center.” Alternative Therapeutics, “Application for Operation of a Medical Marijuana Compassion Center” (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.health.ri.gov/news/temp/mmp/AlternativeTherapeutics.pdf. Taxing products based on where they are grown in an excise or ad valorem scheme would involve more complication.
Some folks might be mad at smoking of any inhalable matter. If marijuana smoking is allowed in public, those folks might like a tax break for marijuana that is incorporated into edibles. But “Contrary to inhaling, it is easy to overdose on edibles - so caution is advised.” That is, edibles might lead to more intoxication than the user had in mind, and that would exasperate even marijuana-sympathetic members of the public.

Home Growers

Economists tend to downplay the amount of revenue at stake with consumers who will grow their own marijuana instead of buying the taxed, commercial kind. A recent Rand study suggests that home growing, at least if limited, would largely succumb to competition from legal mass producers benefiting from economies of scale. Years ago, a Legalizer wrote: “The inducements to home cultivation should not be exaggerated: in Alaska, where it was the one legal way to get marijuana before 1991, pot continued to be sold illicitly at prices around $250 an ounce, proof that many pot smokers are quite disinclined to grow on their own.”

If the cost of taxed marijuana is relatively low, consumers will tend to avoid the hassle of home horticulture. In addition to after-tax price, other factors, like the perceived quality, reliability, and branding of taxed alternatives; the availability of a secure location for plant growth; the consumer’s interest and experience in cultivation; and the regulatory environment will inform the decision.

However small the interest in home growing may be, a tax scheme will need to have some rule, yea or nay. To govern the production of taxed substances for personal use, federal law provides three possible models:

1. absolutely no production: the model for liquor,
2. limited production (100 gallons per individual, 200 gallons per household): the model for beer and wine, and
3. unlimited production: the model for tobacco. The personal use permitted under the last two schemes allows gratuitous transfers, but no sales, of legally produced substances.

The following discussion examines those models for marijuana.

Prohibition

175 Economics of Legalization, supra note 12, at 4.
If home growing is prohibited, the decision to grow one’s own is the decision to buy from a bootlegger writ small. Small, noncommercial growing would be hard to detect, though a federal agency lists 14 ways of noticing that a neighbor may be growing substantial amounts of marijuana.\textsuperscript{177} A tax stamp or other marker is particularly useful if any marijuana anyone possesses has to be tax paid.\textsuperscript{178}

A.B. 2254 effectively prohibits home grown: “The fees and the regulations on growing . . . preclude the growth of marijuana for personal consumption.”\textsuperscript{179}

Limitations

A leading commentator says “California could not feasibly license or tax home-grown marijuana, any more than it could license or tax home-grown tomatoes.”\textsuperscript{180} That’s like saying a government can’t \textit{outlaw} home-grown recreational marijuana, but they all try to, effectively or not.

Weight would not be a good \textit{de minimis} standard for home growing, because field measurement is not feasible and plants could grow beyond plan. Even if weight or potency is the tax base, any threshold of possession should be based on something measurable in the field, like area under cultivation or number of plants.

Proposition 19 would have allowed individuals to cultivate marijuana in an area up to 25 square feet. That would have made tax enforcement difficult: “Suppose there is four pounds of marijuana at my house. Why, officer, that’s the results from my last legal 5′x5′ personal garden harvest. What, you don’t see any 5′x5′ growing space? Well, I used to grow, but I took down my garden and sold my equipment after my last harvest.”\textsuperscript{181} Maybe enforcement efforts would be slack. By analogy, a friend who brews lots of his own beer reports no enforcement of the 200-gallon limit on his operations. He expects no governmental interest unless he starts selling his home brew.

Any limit would have to be high by current standards. One source reports “an average domestic plant yield of 448 grams or approximately 1 pound per plant.”\textsuperscript{182} Even that average would yield

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{178} See the discussion at “Identification,” \textit{infra}.
\item \textsuperscript{179} “Analysis of Ammiano Bill,” Legalization Wiki (Mar. 30, 2010), \textit{available at} \url{http://legalizationwiki.org/Ammiano_Bill_AB_390}. That analysis also applies to the successor bill, A.B. 2254, \textit{supra} note 2.
\item \textsuperscript{180} State and Federal, \textit{supra} note 6, at 237.
\item \textsuperscript{181} “Radical” Russ Belville, “California’s Prop 19: A Word-for-Word analysis” (Jul. 17, 2010), \textit{available at} \url{http://stash.norml.org/californias-prop-19-a-word-for-word-analysis}.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Drug Policy Alliance, “Cannabis Yields 1992,” \textit{available at} \url{http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana/medical/challenges/litigators/legal/plantyeilds/deaplantyields.cfm}. Yields of over five pounds per plant were reported at the upper end of the range.
\end{itemize}
an amount that is over 10 times the felony threshold in North Carolina. The Rand Corporation estimates average consumption per user of about 100 grams per year, or less than four ounces.

Tax Exemption

An unlimited tax exemption for home grown marijuana would, of all the options, forego the most revenue and most tempt growers to engage in illicit commerce. But while tobacco is harder to grow than marijuana, unlimited, tax-free home cultivation of tobacco remains an uncommon hobby. In the Massachusetts Bill, “Like making one’s own beer or wine today, personal cultivation and possession is outside the statute.”

Medical Users

Current Law

Medicinal Alcohol

A medicinal exemption from the federal alcohol tax is now based on the character of the product, not the condition of the user. No federal alcohol tax is imposed on “medicines, medicinal preparations, food products, flavors, flavoring extracts, or perfume containing distilled spirits, which are unfit for beverage purposes.” But a doctor friend who recommends spirits for elders losing weight from lack of appetite reports that pharmacies he works with had never heard of filling a prescription for medicinal alcohol. Medicare and other insurers don’t pay for spirits just as they don’t pay for gluten-free products.

“Sale or use for beverage purposes is indicative of fitness for beverage use“ in the federal scheme. A product may also be found fit for beverage use on the basis of either “the content and

184 Altered State, supra note 8, at 18. See Beau Kilmer et al., Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico 11 n.1, (Rand Corp. 2010) available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf [hereinafter “Mexico”] (listing other sources for an estimate in this range), and id. at 11-12 (discussion of the uncertainty involved in this estimate).
185 For completeness, another scheme would allow a home-grown exemption only for consumption on the premises, indoors or outdoors, of the grower. See “How to Grow and Process Tobacco at Home,” How to Grow Tobacco, available at http://www.howtogrowtobacco.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
186 Massachusetts Bill, supra note 3, Introductory Material.
188 See, e.g., I.R.C. section 5131; id. section 7652(g).
189 27 C.F.R. section 17.134
description of the ingredients” on a required form or “on organoleptic examination”\textsuperscript{191} by a panel of tasters.\textsuperscript{192} The alcohol tax is so low, though, that the after-tax price is lower than the prices of many patented pharmaceuticals.

Even before the process of the repeal of Prohibition finished playing out, Congress removed all restrictions on the medical use of alcohol.\textsuperscript{193} Legalization of medical marijuana may someday be seen as a precursor to full legalization.

\textit{Marijuana}

Medical marijuana is legal in 17 states and the District of Columbia on the basis of a physician’s recommendation.\textsuperscript{194} Its legality turns on the observed or reported condition of the user, not the more objective character of the product. While marijuana differs from the typical prescribed pharmaceutical because it lacks standard dosing regimens,\textsuperscript{195} its efficacy has been reported in some controlled clinical tests.\textsuperscript{196} Substantial numbers of scientists, doctors, patients, and voters—and some Legislatures—say marijuana has medicinal uses. This article wholeheartedly stipulates that it does.\textsuperscript{197}

Since January 1, 2010, the City of Oakland, California, has imposed a specific tax on medical marijuana,\textsuperscript{198} the only kind legal in California. Now ten other California cities do.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{191} Id.
\textsuperscript{193} Pinney, \textit{supra} note 91, at 8.
\textsuperscript{194} Marijuana Policy Project, “State-by-State Medical Marijuana Laws” (2008), \textit{available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/SBSR_NOV2008_1.pdf}. That source is dated but thorough – and it cites the old number of 15. These recommendations are not prescriptions, technically, since marijuana can’t legally be prescribed. Overlooked Powers, \textit{supra} note 26, at 146-47.
\textsuperscript{195} CNBC’s documentary \textit{Marijuana, Inc.} shows a reporter in a marijuana pharmacy or “dispensary” asking, “what’s different about” varieties of medical marijuana for sale, and being told by owner Richard Lee, sponsor of Proposition 19, that it’s like “red and white wine, you know, different flavors of wine.” CNBC, \textit{Marijuana Inc.: Inside America’s Pot Industry} 24 minute mark (first broadcast Jul. 17, 2009), \textit{available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1185791780&play=1} [hereinafter “Marijuana, Inc.”]. Any information about potency and other factors that would seem important to dosing regimens did not survive editing.
\textsuperscript{197} An op-ed article by a sitting New York judge is but one example of the overwhelming evidence for medical use. Gustin L. Reichbach, “A Judge’s Plea for Pot” (May 16, 2012), \textit{available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/opinion/a-judges-plea-for-medical-marijuana.html?_r=1&hp}.
\textsuperscript{198} That tax is a modest 1.8 percent of gross receipts. City of Oakland, “A Resolution Submitting, on the Council’s Own Motion [various matters to voters]” (Jul. 23, 2010), \textit{available at http://clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/25613.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{199} See Table 1, \textit{supra}.
A specific tax on medical marijuana doesn’t necessarily mean that a city is mad at it. The city may instead be singling out a highly profitable business that can afford to pay a blunt-instrument gross receipts tax. Berkeley, for example, taxes per $1,000 of gross receipts are $0.60 for grocery stores (a low-margin business), $3.60 for doctors’ and other professional offices (with higher margins than grocery stores), $100.00 for professional sports events (presumably a cash cow), and $150.00 for gun shops.\(^{200}\)

The California cities that voted to tax medical marijuana in November 2010 all would have taxed recreational marijuana, too, if Proposition 19 had passed.\(^{201}\) Some cities would have taxed both kinds at the same rate, presumably for one or more of three reasons: (1) similar profitability, (2) administrative convenience, and (3) concern about imposters. Other cities, like Berkeley, would have sacrificed administrative convenience and taxed sellers of recreational marijuana (at $100.00 per $1,000 of gross receipts) more heavily than sellers of medical marijuana ($25.00 per $1,000).

**Legalization Proposals**

Unenacted proposals to legalize marijuana for all adult users run the gamut of analogies, from Penicillin to Pabst Blue Ribbon, about whether to tax medical marijuana. At one extreme, A.B. 2254 provides: “no fee shall be imposed under this part on marijuana used medicinally with a doctor’s recommendation.”\(^{202}\) At the other extreme, the Massachusetts bill\(^{203}\) simply taxes all marijuana, medical or not.

**Healthy Imposters**

One anti-marijuana source alleges, “The vast majority of those using crude Marijuana as medicine are young and are using the substance to be under the influence of THC and have no critical medical condition.”\(^{204}\) A facially more objective source, a documentary produced by CNBC, shows a reporter saying, more subtly, that medical marijuana cards are “remarkably easy to come by.”\(^{205}\)

Even sympathizers show irritation with posing. “‘We all support [medical marijuana],’ [Los Angeles City Councilman Dennis Zine] says. ‘It’s been abused, and it’s simply a mask for the

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\(^{201}\) See Table 1, supra.

\(^{202}\) A.B. 2254, supra note 2, proposed section 34004 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

\(^{203}\) Massachusetts Bill, supra note 3.

\(^{204}\) California Police Chiefs’ Association Position Paper on the Decriminalization of Marijuana” (Sep. 2009), available at http://www.californiapolicechiefs.org/nav_files/marijuana_files/files/CPCA_Position_Paper_Decriminalization_Marijuana.pdf. The Police Chiefs’ website goes on: “It has become clear, despite the claims of use by critically ill people that only about 2% of those using crude Marijuana for medicine are critically ill.” Many individuals who have never been critically ill have taken plenty of medicine, though.

\(^{205}\) Marijuana, Inc., supra note 195, 23 minute mark.
recreational use of marijuana, with the doctors who write prescriptions at will for a different dollar value, whether its [sic] $65 or $100 or $200... People are abusing it, and they are simply using it to get high.”

This article takes as given that a non-negligible number of people get recommendations for medical marijuana that they use for recreational purposes.

Arguments for Special Rules

Users and suppliers of medical marijuana make several arguments against its taxation. Compassion should preclude taxation. Medicine is not something that people are or should be mad at; on the contrary, we tend to subsidize it. Prescribed medicine bears no sales taxes or European-style value added taxes. Taxes on medicine tend to be more regressive than taxes on ordinary necessities, because sick people are not so able to earn a wage as healthy ones. Any recreational imposters should not be allowed to burden sick people.

Arguments against Special Rules

Affordability

Four factors may offset the financial burden of a tax on medical marijuana, at least in a jurisdiction that moves from prohibition directly to legalization.

• Total cost to the patient after legalization will probably go down, at least in the short run, as government keeps taxes down to compete with bootleggers. A Rand study raises the possibility of a price decrease of around 75 percent from current street prices, even after taxes are paid.207

• If there were no distinction between users on the basis of medical need, new patients wouldn’t have to scrape up a doctor’s fee since they wouldn’t need a recommendation.

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207 “Altered State,” supra note 8, comparing a recently estimated current street price per ounce of $300 to $450 per ounce (at page 17) to a possible post-legalization total price to the consumer of $88, consisting of retail price of $38 plus tax of $50 (at 19-20). A taxed “dose” of medical marijuana would be cheaper than a dose of many prescription drugs whose prices include extraordinary profits derived by intangible-intensive industries and attributable to high costs of often unsuccessful research and development.
• States typically charge nontrivial application or other fees for medical marijuana patients,\textsuperscript{208} though California cuts its fee from $66 to $33 for less well-off Medical patients.\textsuperscript{209} Patients would avoid those fees.

• Patients may be able to use standard help available for pharmaceuticals generally. Private insurance companies, disparage them as we may, decide routinely who is sick and what medicine sick people need. (Tax authorities don’t.) Private charities may help.\textsuperscript{210} The uninsured with means can bear the tax. The sympathetic case is the uninsured who are both poor and sick. Medicaid or other benefit programs may someday be available, and the enactment of health insurance reform may provide more help. But maybe not enough.

Administrability

In tax policy, simplicity is the enemy of fairness.\textsuperscript{211} Any special tax rule for medical marijuana hands government the task of making or monitoring decisions about people that categorize later events when the tax break is claimed. This is a challenge.

Tax rules routinely draw bright lines between substances, as the federal government does when taxing wines with alcohol content of 13.9 percent and of 14.0 percent at different per gallon rates. But categorizing human beings can be more difficult.

To be sure, there are easy categorizations, like the extra federal tax exemption for individuals 65 and over (though the circumstances of one’s birth may draw suspicion, as President Obama has learned). The extra tax exemption for blindness on the Form 1040 draws bright numerical lines\textsuperscript{212} that are objective on their face, though they depend on a doctor who submits a report to the IRS.

Some standards (the presence of AIDS, ALS, cancer, and much more) for medical marijuana recommendations are objective. Others are not. Thirteen of the 15 States that allow medical marijuana do so for pain that is variously described as chronic, severe, severe chronic, debilitating, or intractable.\textsuperscript{213} Ninety-four percent of Colorado marijuana patients say they suffer

\begin{footnotes}
\item[208] Medical Card, \textit{supra} note 156.
\item[210] \textit{But see} Marijuana Policy Project, \textit{“Medical Marijuana Financial Assistance Program,”} \url{http://www.mpp.org/about/medical-marijuana.html} (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (indicating that a “scholarship” program to pay state registry fees has been suspended).
\item[211] Fairness is in the eye of the beholder. Simplicity, too, is the enemy of special tax breaks.
\item[212] Reg. sec. 1.151-1(d). A person is blind with no better than 20/200 vision in the better eye with correcting lenses, or if the widest diameter of her or his visual field subtends an angle no greater than 20 degrees.
\item[213] Marijuana Policy Project, \textit{“A Comparison of Key Aspects of State Medical Marijuana Laws,”} \textit{available at} \url{http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/StateMMJLawsKeyFeatures.pdf} (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
\end{footnotes}
“severe pain.” Drawing bright lines between people whose chronic pain is enough to warrant medication and everyone else is difficult. No one is perfectly whole. A friend puts it this way: “We all have chronic pain in the soul.”

Drawing medical lines can expand into an industry. Determination of Social Security disability has led to so many disputes that lawyers make it a specialty. The stakes in those disputes are high enough to pay lawyers on both sides. But for medical marijuana determinations, the case-by-case game is not worth the government’s candle.

Once government has identified patients eligible for tax relief, it needs to provide that relief to patients but not to others at transaction time. Some California cities may have considered parallel distribution channels, with patients buying only at tax-favored dispensaries, and recreational users paying full tax at stores. But current schemes that exempt charitable purchasers from sales tax seem more workable: sellers sell to all comers, and provide relief at the point of sale, ordinarily on the basis of an official document. Such a document would work like a commercial coupon or food stamps, but could be lent or counterfeited.

What if a patient buys marijuana for recreational use? That example shows the problem of enforceability with drawing the line between uses.

Lying

Any special rule based on reports of unprovable symptoms creates an incentive for individuals seeking recreational use to lie. Unpoliced, this kind of rule leads to disrespect for the law. It may even lead to disrespect for the medical profession, to the extent that some doctors get the reputation of believing all or nearly all claims that lead to a recommendation for marijuana.

Self-Perception

An incentive to see one’s self as a victim leads to the opposite of positive thinking. If healthy people want something and have to say they are sick to get it, they may come to think they are sick or even become sick, like the child who hates school and develops a stomachache in the morning. But this incentive, like that for lying, is also present in any disability insurance plan, public or private. Seeing one’s self as a victim finds noble expression in fighting for one’s rights or well-being. Seeing others as victims calls well-meaning people to action. But the incentive to save a little money through a tax break for medical marijuana seems less powerful than the incentive to be able to consume it legally at all, which is the incentive that folks in medical

214 Mainstreamed, supra note 37, at 36.
marijuana states face today.

Revenue

Any special break diminishes the tax base. The fiscal drain may extend beyond patients: if the tax differential is significant, patients may sell illicitly to recreational users or bring medicine to share with healthy people at a potluck.

Protecting the Tax Base by Restricting Doctors

One way to protect the tax base from recreational users who pose as patients is to tighten standards for honoring doctors’ recommendations. States that have allowed doctors to specialize in marijuana recommendations are already facing a backlash. 216 Bright line rules have attempted to address the problem. For instance, during Prohibition, the federal government limited the number of prescriptions that doctors could write for medicinal alcohol. 217 More recently, Colorado allowed doctors to write marijuana recommendations for no more than five patients. 218 But the federal restrictions were just temporary, and Colorado’s limitation did not last, either.

What Tax Enforcement?

Identification

Sophisticated markers, like high-technology stamps, 219 can identify tax-paid cigarettes. “Currently, 47 states require proof—via marking the cigarette packages with stamps—that state cigarette taxes have been paid.” 220 My tobacco-friendly state of North Carolina requires no stamps, though, because smugglers (even some with terrorist ties 221) boost the state’s revenue.

217 See 1933 Hearings, supra note 9, at 18.
In Canada, monitoring of tear tape, “the pressure-sensitive plastic ribbon that is wrapped around a package of cigarettes to facilitate the opening of the cellophane wrapping that encloses the package,” also aims to prevent evasion. The U.S. Treasury has proposed a “track and trace” system, using bar codes or the like, for cigarettes.

Knowing of technology used to enforce the California cigarette tax, staff of the state’s Board of Equalization investigated stamps for identification of tax-paid marijuana in case Proposition 19 passed. Colorado officials are “considering mandating that medical pot include radio-frequency identification devices, somewhat like coded tags on library books, to keep track of who’s getting what.”

Seals or stamps could mark not only a pack of cigarettes but also a pouch like those in which pipe tobacco is now sold. A seal or stamp could also mark packages of infused brownies, sodas, olive oil, chewing gum, or whatever policy-makers allow.

An open container, even empty, could give a rebuttable presumption of legality for the quantity it can contain. To be sure, such a presumption would allow evaders to re-fill an open container with contraband, in the style of my friend who pours cheap Scotch into single malt bottles to impress his guests. As a corollary, there could be a rebuttable presumption of evasion for any unpackaged amount that would not fit into the largest legally sold package. In that scenario, users would need to finish one package before opening the next one.

Consumable markers are conceivable. We dye tax-exempt home heating oil, for example, to distinguish it from otherwise identical taxable diesel fuel. In distinguishing tax paid marijuana from nontax paid marijuana, any consumable marker to would have to be nontoxic, hard to counterfeit, inexpensive to apply, and easy to detect in the field.

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223 Treasury Tobacco Report, supra note 150, at 9-10 and n. 22 at 9.


Individual paper cylinders (once out of a sealed package) could bear a non-toxic mark, using technology like that used to fight counterfeiting of currency. Users who didn’t want to smoke would take the marijuana out of its paper tube before, say, incorporating it into food.

Genetic markers of the kind that seed companies use to identify plants whose material and offspring they claim to own\(^{227}\) might someday allow identification of tax-paid marijuana.\(^{228}\) This kind of genetic engineering sounds far-fetched, but scientists are working on an analogous task: “a desirable step [toward eliminating confusion between hemp and psychoactive Cannabis] is to make drug-free plants visually recognizable. Since the hairs can be seen with a magnifying glass, this could be accomplished by engineering a hairless Cannabis plant.”\(^{229}\) But even allowing government enough power to require such markers might not preclude cloning or other bootlegging techniques.

**Tracking**

From the outset, governments can track taxable substances by monitoring the raw materials that go into them. Beer-makers are advised, “Since you must report the usage of malt and hops and beer loss, agents can spot reports that may be fraudulent. Also, when the TTB comes in for an audit they will look at brewing records, raw material invoices and whatever else they wish to examine to determine if your operation is legit.”\(^{230}\) Similarly, “monitoring of raw leaf tobacco [to] . . . control the supply of raw leaf tobacco from grower to manufacturer” is part of Canada’s comprehensive excise system.\(^{231}\)

During the production phase, until the federal liquor tax scheme was dramatically relaxed in 1979, there was a “system of joint control under which IRS agents were kept on the premises and their presence required when certain actions were performed to insure collection of the taxes. Spirits were kept under government lock and seal until denatured, the tax had been determined, or the spirits removed for a legitimate tax exempt or tax free purpose. Generally, taxes were


There’s more. Since shortly after the repeal of Prohibition, the federal government has banned transportation of liquor in containers holding more than one gallon. Keeping track of liquor bottles, a distinct form of packaging, still helps the federal government collect taxes on spirits.

Technology offers new forms of tracking. In Colorado, “Owners will soon be required to place video cameras throughout their cultivation sites and dispensaries.” The cameras will “trace the movement of every marijuana bud from the moment its seeds are planted to the point of sale” and will capture the face and photo identification card of every patient. “The video will be transmitted to a website accessible to regulator round the clock.” Weighing is to be caught on camera. This kind of technology could allow citizens to watch via video as officials assess tax at the moment of the placement of goods under seal.

The better a tracking scheme works, the more it is likely to cost too much and to intrude on privacy. Workable schemes lie between the honor system and the diamond mine.

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232 Ripy, supra note 111, at 9-10.
233 Hu, supra note 20, at 97.
234 The rules that track bottles include:
27 C.F.R. section 19.634 Receipt and storage of liquor bottles. No proprietor shall accept shipment or delivery of liquor bottles except from the manufacturer thereof, a supplier abroad, or another proprietor. . . . Liquor bottles, including those of less than 200 ml capacity, shall be stored in a safe and secure place, either on the proprietor's qualified premises or at another location.
Id. section 19.638 Disposition of stocks of liquor bottles. When a proprietor discontinues operations, or permanently discontinues the use of a particular size or type of liquor bottle, the stocks of such bottles on hand shall either be disposed of to another person authorized to receive liquor bottles, or destroyed, including disposition for purposes which will render them unusable as bottles.
235 This discussion was stricken from an early draft as too far-fetched before the quoted material appeared in a cover story in Time magazine. Mainstreamed, supra note 37, at 36.
236 Id.
238 Mainstreamed, supra note 37, at 36.
Collection Point

Principles

A principle of excise administration is to assess\textsuperscript{240} tax at a choke point, where the supply chain constricts to involve the smallest number of people and locations.\textsuperscript{241} Then fewer people need to learn the rules (and there should be fewer mistakes), fewer entities need auditing, and both taxpayers in the aggregate and government spend less time and incur less cost in making the system work.

Another principle is to assess tax near the beginning of the supply chain, so that the substance does not leak out of that chain untaxed. Taxes imposed at the end of the chain, like sales taxes, make leakage more likely.

Finding an appropriate assessment point for a newly legalized substance depends on how the industry will be organized. While governments could take a passive role, let the industry evolve, and impose taxes at the best choke point in the structure that turns up, they could instead mandate an organization for the industry that will help meet fiscal needs.

Analogies

For alcohol in the United States, the federal choke point is near the beginning of the chain, as raw materials become alcohol. This process takes place in secure locations. Tax is imposed as or before beverage alcohol is removed from the choke point.\textsuperscript{242}

For tobacco, the choke point is found in the middle of the supply chain, after the time when and distant from the place where the curing or drying process makes harvested tobacco smokable. Smokable tobacco from tens of thousands of domestic farms travels untaxed to manufacturing plants where tax will eventually be assessed.

Options

Putting the choke point at the beginning of the chain for marijuana could involve limiting by license the number of farms or grow areas and placing them under scrutiny. That scheme, involving consolidation of the industry, would conflict with the independent traditions of marijuana growers. But while taxation and regulation may have helped to consolidate the liquor

\textsuperscript{240} This article inartfully uses the words assess and collect as if they were synonyms: they are close enough for this analysis.


\textsuperscript{242} See, e.g., I.R.C. section 5401 et seq. (beer).
and cigarette industries, they can co-exist with a more fragmented industry, like wine. And capital intensity is a separate cause of consolidation in all those industries.

For marijuana, on balance, the middle of the supply chain may be the best assessment point. Staff of the California Board of Equalization, which “typically recommends that excise taxes or fees be imposed as high in the distribution chain as possible,” advised against collecting taxes on marijuana from “the highest point in the distribution chain[,] . . . the grower[,] . . . [because] growers normally sell in bulk volume, which would not be conducive to a unit-based tax.”243 The Staff instead recommended collecting at the level of the distributor/processor, where repackaging would allow for the use of tax stamps.

The Staff concluded that assessment that close to middle of the chain would be adequate. “[G]enerally speaking, growers would be licensed and inspected regularly. By knowing the size of a grower’s crop, we know the approximate amount of product produced. Just like alcohol, some product may go out the back door that the taxing agency is not aware of. This can never be completely controlled. There is no fool proof system to stop all evasion schemes. But by using indicia, licensing all the levels including retailers, and doing regular inspections, the state of California can reduce the evasion level.”244

The end of the supply chain, the point of retail sale, is an ineffective collection point. Shoplifting, pilferage by employees, casual sales, and theft during transit are examples of tax evasion enabled by failing to collect tax early in the process.245

To combine the benefits of a retail price base with those of an early and narrow choke point, the Basic World Tax Code, by Ward Hussey and Don Lubick, suggests imposing excise tax at the time of production as a percentage of “the retail price current at the time of production to achieve a uniform and large base without competitive advantage to vertically organized enterprises.”246

The advantage the World Code seeks to avoid is this: if one company or an affiliated group owns all of a supply chain, there is no third-party time-of-production transfer price to base tax on: the taxpayer has an incentive to understate it. In response, the government has only the wishfully named “arm’s-length” method of guessing at tax pricing, a tool grown so feeble that it

243 BOE Analysis, supra note 224, at 8.
244 Email from BOE spokesperson Anita Gore to the author, quoted in “Collection Point for Marijuana Tax” (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://newrevenue.org/2010/11/04/collection-point-for-marijuana-tax/.
245 But collecting tax early in the process creates a cost that later operators in the supply chain routinely mark up to include a profit. Anecdotally, in the wine business, “every increment of pricing is doubled by the time the wine reaches the consumer.” Sara Schorske, “Refresher Course on Wine Taxes,” Vineyard & Winery Management (Sep./Oct. 1998), available at http://www.csa-compliance.com/html/Articles/RefresherCourseWine.html.
has turned the international tax schemes of the mightiest nations into laughing-stocks.\textsuperscript{247} The World Code avoids that trap.

But the World Code’s approach is not the one to start with. There is no “current retail price” of a product just entering a legal market. Moreover, as the market develops, brands and enterprises may come and go quickly; and deposit of estimated tax up front is only a partial solution. The World Code’s approach will be useful for marijuana taxes only if and when companies are few and brands are stable.

\textbf{A Public Option?}

The line between revenues from excise taxes and those from state monopolies may be hard to draw. “Arguably, profits of government-owned tobacco, alcohol, and gambling monopolies should also be considered part of the excise tax system.”\textsuperscript{248}

A public marijuana monopoly offers advantages over an entrepreneurial model. First, a public seller can tweak prices more quickly than a Legislature can change adjust tax rates, so it can offer stiff and nimble competition to bootleggers in the inevitable price war.

Second, a state monopoly should and apparently does tend to maximize net revenue generally. Virginia’s retail monopoly on sales of liquor, for example, raises gross revenue that is reportedly an order of magnitude greater than taxes produce in neighboring Maryland and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{249} That monopoly, combined with taxes, yields this result: “In the District and most of Maryland, just a dollar or two from a fifth of Jack Daniel’s goes to government. But in Virginia, where whiskey and every other kind of liquor is sold in state-run stores, more than $13 of the retail price goes to the state.”\textsuperscript{250} But gross and net are completely different. The District and Maryland incur no costs for facilities or people to conduct a retail business.

Third, monopoly offers more stable long-term revenue. “It is rare for states to raise excise tax rates on alcoholic beverages because the alcohol industry powerfully lobbies against any such increases. As effective tax rates on alcohol erode over time, states that privatize alcohol sales will find it difficult to match the revenue they previously realized from state-run stores by raising

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{247} Cf. Charles I. Kingson, “The Great American Jobs Act Caper,” 58 Tax L. Rev. 327, 387 (2005) (“Deciding how much one’s left hand contributes to one’s right may constitute a career, but not much of a life.”). The “arm’s-length” method was more workable when it arose, because commerce then involved few intangibles. Now, “the foolish continuation of separate company accounting for the affiliates of large multinationals” is losing so much steam that “transfer pricing may well be gone in a decade, replaced by formulary apportionment.” Lee A. Sheppard, in Forty Years, supra note 89, at 21. Whether the marijuana industry will be as intangible-intensive as the alcohol and tobacco industries remains to be seen.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{248} Theory and Practice, supra note 11, at 2.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{250} Id.}
\end{footnotes}
state alcohol tax rates.”251 A similar argument would apply to legalized marijuana taxed on the basis of weight or potency without indexing.

Fourth, public monopoly offers more regulatory controls. The mayor of Juarez, Mexico, expresses that view this way: “If you want to end the violence and the corruption it creates, . . . you only need to turn the business over to governments.”252

A monopoly has disadvantages. First, private industry is ordinarily more efficient than a state monopoly, though efficiency may not help sell a plan to a public that is to some extent mad at marijuana use.

Second, state monopoly can lead not only to inefficiency but also to waste, conflicts of interest, sweetheart deals, and corruption. In North Carolina, for instance, liquor for off premises consumption, a state monopoly, has proved prone to embarrassing scandal.253

Third, the argument that a state taxing undesirable goods tends to become compromised in its opposition to them applies a fortiori to a State that sells such goods.

Fourth, and most seriously, in the short run at least, a monopoly would move the state into the marijuana business. That move would put the state itself in violation of federal law, and would need from the federal government benign neglect of a new and high order,254 involving a special kind of comity.

On balance, state monopoly combined with excise taxation and license fees should provide the richest revenue source. Monopoly is also likely to provide the most bulletproof regulatory scheme. In states now without medical marijuana, it would face no entrenched opposition from legally operating entrepreneurs. A final and perhaps overriding factor is that states have only one chance to set up a monopoly; a state can always switch from monopoly to a private model, but it can’t ordinarily switch the other way. Faced with the unknown and the choice of use it or lose it, “use it” is often the shrewd and prudent answer.

The Washington bill255 imposes no tax. But it would allow each city, town, and unincorporated area to decide, by petition and referendum, to allow marijuana sales through state-owned stores.

254 State and Federal, supra note 6, at 247-48.
255 Supra note 4.
The state would take revenue by marking the price up, as it does now for liquor: a state board would “from time to time” set the price of marijuana as it does now for liquor, with a cap of 35 percent (presumably of gross revenue from sales).\textsuperscript{256}

**When?**

**Effective Date**

A.B. 2254 would be effective 30 days after adoption of regulations.\textsuperscript{257} Under Proposition 19, marijuana would have become legal immediately under operation of California law. The staff of the state’s Board of Equalization anticipated that after enactment of any statewide weight-based tax scheme, eight months would be needed to implement it.\textsuperscript{258}

To avoid confrontation with the federal government, state legislation could delegate authority to the executive branch to bring the scheme into force. For instance, some official could stand ready to promulgate final regulations (which would trigger effectiveness) if the federal government said OK or if the official decided it had winked or blinked.

**Sunsetting**

With a sunset, legalization and taxation could expire after some number of years unless voters or the Legislature approved extension. Sunsetting an untried scheme puts inertia, inherent in the legislative process, on the side of caution.\textsuperscript{259}

At the federal level, Congress’s repeated sunsetting of tax benefits has been criticized as sacrificing tax policy to political expediency – to the point of giving sunsetting a bad name.\textsuperscript{260} Sunsetted or expiring tax benefits tend to give lobbyists sinecures and to keep campaign contributions flowing. They understate cost, because they lose revenue for only a part of the relevant fiscal window. Tax burdens require a different analysis. Sunsetting them understates revenue gain.

But sunsets have a legitimate purpose: to reverse the burden of going forward when rules are in fact experimental. Legalization of marijuana and everything associated with it would be a series

\textsuperscript{256} Id. section 31.

\textsuperscript{257} A.B. 2254, supra note 2, proposed section 26070 of the Division 9 of the California Business and Professions Code. Meanwhile, section 37 of the bill makes other provisions effective on the adoption of other regulations, “which is to occur no later than July 1, 2005.” The reader is left to wonder about that inappropriate effective date.

\textsuperscript{258} BOE Analysis, supra note 224, at 11.

\textsuperscript{259} Legislative inertia is an even bigger problem with tax treaties, which cry out for sunsetting. See note 25 supra.

of experiments. For a new marijuana tax, a sunset date could terminate legislative delegation (to a nimble official) of the power to set rates. After a set period of time thought adequate to fight a tumultuous price war, rate-setting power would automatically return to the deliberative legislature. The legislature could always extend the time of delegation, but only by an affirmative vote.

**Conclusion**

As it scratches the surface of a new area of tax law, this article reaches several conclusions. Marijuana is hard to tax, so any schemes to tax it have to be flexible. Tax rates on marijuana need to be low at first to gain advantage in the inevitable price war against bootleggers. As taxing authorities win that war, they can raise rates and generate more revenue. Indexing of dollar amounts is essential. The tax can omit special rules for medical marijuana. State monopoly is a viable option. But this article reaches no conclusion on other issues, like whether the ideal of a potency base is feasible, what to do about home-grown marijuana, and whether any scheme will bring in enough revenue to be politically palatable.

History tells us that, “it took a full-time, multiyear effort for . . . researchers and planners . . . to come up with a workable beginning blueprint for post-prohibition alcohol control [and many other players participated eventually]. Furthermore, this system has been constantly adjusted ever since.” Any new revenue scheme starting from zero is bound to leak, overreach, or otherwise need fixing as time brings unanticipated consequences to light. It will need the work of many minds.

261 Lessons, supra note 14.